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WINDS OF CHANGE: DRAWING ON
WATER LAW DOCTRINES TO ESTABLISH
WIND LAW
YAEL R. LIFSHITZ*
Wind presents a promising, clean resource for energy
production, which is likely to become even more significant in
years to come given the challenges of climate change and the ever-
increasing need for new sources of energy.. However, while wind
energy has many ecological and economic advantages, harvesting
the energy from wind also presents some striking challenges with
respect to property allocation and the use of natural resources.
Specifically, the extraction of wind by one wind farm can reduce
the wind available for others in the downwind direction. Despite
the importance of wind resources, there is little judicial or
legislative guidance on the governance of wind This Note outlines
potential structires for wind regimes by drawing on more mature
regimes governing a similarly fluid and fugitive asset-water-
which provides helpful guidance for crafting wind law.
This Note argues that, overall, an administrative permitting
system that resembles the regulated riparian regime may be the
best suited system for governing our wind resources. In addition to
the permitting system, wind markets may be established to allow
trading of wind rights between users so that the most efficient
siting will take place through the market system. This may be
especially useful in areas where the use of wind is more
competitive. Urban localities, which are becoming increasingly
relevant because of the recent expansion of distributed generation
projects, provide an interesting example of such a competitive
setting.
* NYU School of Law, Doctor of Juridical Science Candidate. I am very
grateful to Vanessa Casado-P6rez, Richard Epstein, Michael Livermore, and
Tamar Megiddo for their comments. I am especially indebted to Katrina Wyman,
Richard Revesz and Lewis Kornhauser for their insightful comments and their
ongoing support.
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INTRODUCTION
Although there is still much scientific uncertainty regarding
the best mitigation measures to address climate change, it is widely
agreed that one way to reduce its effects, or at least to slow the
process, is to decrease our greenhouse gas emissions by changing
our energy mix.' Wind is a major contender in the new mix. As
opposed to fossil fuel energy production, wind has practically no
carbon emissions and therefore helps mitigate the harmful
environmental impacts associated with traditional fossil fuel
energy production methods.2 Indeed, wind energy production has
grown significantly in recent years due to its environmental
advantages and because it has become increasingly price-
competitive.3 And, given the potential wind energy capacity in the
United States,4 further growth is likely to occur.5
I See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier:
Climate Change, Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38
ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 66 (2011); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local
Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 879 (2011); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying
America's Energy Future: The Future ofRenewable Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 505, 506-08 (2008); see also Human and Natural Drivers of Climate
Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, www.ipcc.ch/
publications anddata/ar4/wgl/en/spmsspm-human-and.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2015) (describing dramatic increases in GHGs since 1750 and noting that
these increases have been "due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change"
and have altered the "energy balance of the climate system"); Wind Energy &
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Role of Wind Energy in Addressing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, http://www.awea.org/
Resources/Content.aspx?ltemNumber-5097 (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
2 A report by the U.S. Department of Energy indicates, for instance, that
under a scenario where 20 percent of energy comes from wind energy by 2030,
we could avoid 825 million tons of CO2 annually, and, by 2050, over 15,000
million metric tons of CO 2 emissions could be averted. See U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY'S
CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRIC SUPPLY 13-15 (2008) [hereinafter 20% WIND
BY 2030], www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41869.pdf, see also Alan J. Alexander,
Note, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and a Severable
Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429, 431 (2011); Joseph 0. Wilson,
Note, The Answer, My Friends, Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed
Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1782
(2004).
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, 2014 WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 46 (2015); see generally
Mark Bolinger & Ryan Wiser, Understanding Wind Turbine Price Trends in the
U.S. Over the Past Decade, 42 ENERGY POL'Y 628 (2011) (discussing the trends
in wind energy prices over the last decade).
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, WIND VISION: A NEW ERA FOR WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 21.
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Wind also plays an important role in our daily lives and our
natural environment. It is a powerful element of nature that shapes
landscapes by sculpting rocks or carrying sediments6 and moving
clouds.7 Wind lifts vapor upwards, where it condenses into clouds,
and it influences the oceans by creating waves.8 Wind holds a
significant ecological role in aiding plants in dispersal and
reproduction by shifting pollens, leaves, and bacteria from one
region to another.9 Wind is also responsible for shifting polluted
air downwind, thus dispersing the pollution over a larger area,10
perhaps to the detriment of some and the benefit of others. Lastly,
wind holds an important recreational role in our lives by enabling
wind-surfing and kite-flying-or something as simple as carrying
the aroma of fresh coffee or baked goods in the morning. Wind
may be invisible, but its effects are apparent in our everyday lives,
and without wind, life on earth would be quite different.
While wind energy has many ecological and economic
advantages, harvesting the energy from wind presents challenges
with respect to property allocation and the use of natural resources.
The nub of the problem is that, despite its naturally replenishing
properties, wind is not entirely unlimited. The process of
extracting energy from the wind inevitably changes its current,
since harvesting the kinetic energy locked in the wind results in a
(2015) (discussing the wind energy potential in the United States and noting that
there are over "15,000 GW of technical wind resource potential, both land-based
and offshore, that can be harnessed and delivered reliably").
5 As of 2011, wind energy accounted for roughly 3.3 percent of total U.S.
electricity supply. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2011 WIND TECHNOLOGIES
MARKET REPORT, at iii (2012), http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/2011
windtechnologies market report.pdf. A report by the U.S. Department of
Energy suggests that the United States has the potential wind energy capacity to
meet at least 20 percent of its needs through wind power by 2030. See 20% WIND
BY 2030, supra note 2, at 13-15.
6 C. DONALD AHRENS, METEOROLOGY TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
WEATHER, CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 227-28 (Keith Dodson et al. eds.,
8th ed. 2007).
7 See id at 222, 232.
8 See id.
9 Although plants do not primarily spread their seeds through wind, it
provides dispersal for a large percentage of the biomass produced by land plants.
See JAMES D. MAUSETH, BOTANY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLANT BIOLOGY 195-
96, 208-11 (4th ed. 2008).
10 For an extensive review of the transportation of pollutants by the wind,
see B. J. ALLOWAY & D. C. AYRES, CHEMICAL PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION 27-35 (2d ed. 1997).
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depleted breeze in the downwind direction."I Extracting energy
from the wind creates a "wind wake" or a "wind-shadow," similar
to the wake created in the water behind a boat, such that the air
stream is depleted and the wind current is altered, at least in the
immediate wake of the turbine.12 Therefore, although wind has the
ability to regenerate over a certain time and distance, extracting
wind alters the air stream in the downwind direction.'3
This Note argues that extracting energy from the wind could
thus lead to conflicts over the use of existing wind resources. If,
for example, a farmer located downwind from the wind turbines
wishes to construct a wind farm of her own, she would have less
energy potential than would her upwind neighbor due to the
depleted wind stream she was receiving.
This difficulty arises with large scale wind farms, but can be
just as problematic in urban localities with regards to individual
turbines positioned on rooftops, where residents may come into
conflict over the use of the wind. Moreover, consider what would
happen to the families living in a downwind portion of a
neighborhood or city if too many families in the upwind area were
utilizing the wind for energy production. It may be hard to picture
such a situation today, but the effect could be similar to the
construction of too many dams on a river, in the sense that the
downstream users may suffer shortages. -
The same problem can also exist even when the wind is not
extracted but merely obstructed. Consider for instance the wind
current in the wake of a particularly tall or wide building.
Although the building does not extract the energy locked within
the wind, it still changes the current. The ability of the family
downwind from the tall building to enjoy the many advantages of
wind- from cooling homes, to flying kites, to clean energy
production-is decreased.
These wind wake conflicts can be seen as a problem of
externalities.14 Since the property interests in land have
traditionally extended to the airspace above, each landowner feels
free to harvest the wind blowing over her land. The landowner can
produce energy from the wind, thereby gaining profits. Each
II See infra Part L.A.
12 See infra Part L.A.
13 See infra Part L.A.
14 See infra Part I.B.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2015 437
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
farmer enjoys the gains produced from the turbine but does not
shoulder the costs imposed on the neighbors in the downwind
direction. Likewise, a developer reaps the benefits of erecting a tall
building but does not pay for the effect it causes on wind. Thus,
both the farmer and the developer have no incentive to internalize
the costs of the wind wake effects they created, which could
ultimately lead them to consume the wind resources in excess. 1
Given the potential conflicts over wind use, and because of
the current expansion of wind energy projects, policy makers are
likely to face a challenge with respect to regulating such projects
and managing the existing wind resources soon. Moreover, despite
the apparent significance of wind energy production and the
importance of efficient allocation of wind resources, at present
there is a lack of comprehensive legislative and judiciary guidance
on this issue.16
This Note discusses which regimes we could employ to best
manage and foster our wind resources while protecting
individuals' rights to use wind as it blows over their land. I refer to
these rights as "wind rights." Wind rights are essentially use rights
that provide an entitlement to use a certain portion of the resource
as it passes by. This includes the right to extract the airborne
kinetic energy locked within the wind, although the right can also
be used for 'in-stream' purposes.'7 Thus, wind rights can be used
for producing electricity from the wind, and, indeed, many of the
examples discussed in this Note will be framed in such terms.'8
But wind rights can also apply just as well to the ability to cool
one's home, fly a kite, or foster seed pollination. To clarify, while
many other studies regarding renewable energies focus on various
mechanisms such as tax credits, loans, or renewable portfolio
standards,19 this Note takes a different view: it examines the wind
15 See infra Part L.B.
16 See infra Part II (discussing the current regimes regarding use of wind).
17 1 use the term 'in-stream' to refer to any negligibly-extractive uses, ones
that utilize the airborne kinetic energy within the wind current but which extract
de minimis amounts of it. For example, both flying a kite and seed pollination are
made possible by the kinetic energy in the wind, but they do not extract any
meaningful amount of that energy.
18 See infra Part II (discussing wind rights mostly in terms of energy
production).
19 See Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation
of Wind Law, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 168-76 (2010) (reviewing the
mechanisms in place specifically with regards to wind); N.C. Clean Tech. Ctr.,
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from a property rights perspective. This Note views wind as a
resource subject to property rights and examines it accordingly.20
Drawing on analogous water regimes, this Note examines the
applicability of four different water regimes to manage wind
resources and craft emerging wind law. In brief, this Note argues
that an administrative permit system that resembles the regulated
riparian regime may be best suited for managing our wind
resources. This is based on such a system's ability to provide
sufficient certainty to spur investment in resource development,
while at the same time reasonably accounting for a number of
public interests.21 In addition, once the property interests in wind
are defined through a permitting system, they can be traded.22
Thus, in some areas, 'wind markets' could be established. This
would allow users to trade wind permits, such that the most
efficient siting will take place through the market system. A
market mechanism may be especially useful in areas where the use
of wind is likely to be more competitive, such as residential or
urban settings.2 3 Lastly, traditional riparianism may also apply in
certain locations, mostly in regions where the use of wind is less
competitive, and, in fact, a traditional riparian regime may be the
N.C. State Univ., Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (cataloging the
current State initiatives on renewables and energy efficiency). With regards to
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs), see, e.g., Francesca F. Bochner, Water,
Wind, and Fire: A Call for A Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 25 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 201, 202-04 (2014) (discussing recent developments with
regards to RPSs in the United States); id at 206-09 (regarding international
RPSs); see also Timothy P. Duane, Greening the Grid: Implementing Climate
Change Policy Through Energy Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio Standards, and
Strategic Transmission System Investments, 34 VT. L. REV. 711, 759-66 (2010)
(explaining the structure and function of RPSs and discussing some notable
examples in the United States).
20 This Note takes a broad understanding of 'property.' This entails
recognizing an individual interest in using a portion of the wind (perhaps under
restrictions, such as place, amount, or time). However, this does not require any
particular means of protecting that interest. As will be illustrated in Part 11 below,
the rights themselves can have various structures and can be protected by
different institutions, such as courts or legislators. More simply, they can be
recognized de facto by the users themselves. Any time an interest in the use of
the wind is recognized and protected, it falls within a broad understanding of
property and therefore is within the scope of this Note.
21 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the application of regulated riparianism to
wind).
22 See infra Part IV.D (discussing the idea of setting up a "wind market" that
would be analogous to water markets).
23 See id
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de facto regime in many areas today.24
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I illustrates the potential
complexities and conflicts arising from wind use given the wind
wake effects and suggests that these present an externalities
problem. Part II briefly describes the current legal regimes
governing wind resources (or lack thereof). Part III explains why
drawing on water regimes might be fruitful. Part IV then illustrates
four possible water regimes in the United States and discusses the
potential applicability of existing water regimes to wind resources,
examining the advantages and complexities of each regime in this
respect.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
A. The Complexities Associated with Extracting Energy from the
Wind
Given the current expansion of wind energy projects, policy
makers are soon likely to face a challenge with respect to
regulating such projects and managing existing wind resources.
Since property interests in land have traditionally extended to the
air space above it, each landowner currently feels free to harvest
the wind blowing over her land.25 The landowner can thus produce
energy from the wind, gaining profits.
However, the process of extracting energy from the wind
changes its current, as the use of energy locked in the wind results
24 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the application of riparianism to wind).
25 Users may feel free to harvest the wind if, for instance, landowners
implicitly adhere to the ad coelom notion. The full statement of the maxim is
"cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos" ("he who owns the soil
owns also to the sky and to the depths"). For further discussion of the ad coelum
rule, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law ofNuisance,
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 992 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 16 (1985);
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
171-79 (2d ed. 2012); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA.
L. REV. 270, 278-79 (2011). Alternatively, they could assume a 'riparian'
regime, which entitles all landowners underlying a wind current to extract a
portion of the energy. See infra Part IV.A (discussing riparian regimes). Third, it
could be drawn from an analogy to 'solar rights' or wildlife use rights. Solar
rights provide for unobstructed access to the sun. Wildlife use rights stipulate
that a landowner may capture game passing through her land, up to the moment
it crosses over her property line. For the purpose of this analysis it does not
matter what analogy is followed. The main point is that users extract energy
without accounting for the downwind effects.
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in a depleted breeze in the downwind direction. Wind is the
flowing or movement of air on the surface of the earth, caused by
differences in air pressure due to alternations in temperatures.
Since warmer air rises over cooler air, a low pressure pocket is
created.26 Wind arises as air moves to fill cooler, low pressure
areas.27 The movement of air also allows for energy production:
wind turbines create electricity by capturing some of the wind's
kinetic energy and converting it to electric energy.28 Wind causes
the rotation of the feather-shaped blades of the turbine, which are
connected to an internal gearbox that generates electric energy by
spinning large magnets.29
Extracting energy from the wind current thus inevitably
results in a weaker wind stream in the downwind direction.30 This
follows from the basic physics principle that energy acts as a
closed system.31 When energy is transferred from one form (for
26 AHRENS, supra note 6, at 203-14 (describing the physical forces that
create and influence the wind); see also NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, WIND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, at 1-
1-1-2 (2010), http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/Publications/Research/
Biomass-Solar-Wind/wind-resource-assessment-toolkit.pdf ("[T]he air moves in
response to pressure differences, or gradients, between different parts of the
earth's surface. An air mass tends to move towards a zone of low pressure and
away from a zone of high pressure.").
27 See ROLAND B. STULL, METEOROLOGY FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
205 (2nd ed. 2000); SIDNEY BOROWITZ, FAREWELL FOSSIL FUELS: REVIEWING
AMERICA'S ENERGY POLICY 145 (1999).
28 Adam M. Dinnell & Adam J. Russ, The Legal Hurdles to Developing
Wind Power as an Alternative Energy Source in the United States: Creative and
Comparative Solutions, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 535, 539-40 (2007).
29 Id. at 539-40; How Do Wind Turbines Work?, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://energy.gov/eere/wind/how-do-wind-turbines-work (last visited Sept. 21,
2015). The turbine's blades are also designed such that, as the wind speed
increases, they gradually "feather," or decrease their angle of approach. As a
result, the turbine spins at a constant speed regardless of the wind speed, and
power generation can remain fairly steady. See STULL, supra note 27, at 207. The
Public Health and Welfare Act follows a similar technical description in
providing that "the term 'wind energy system' means a system of components
which converts the kinetic energy of the wind into electricity or mechanical
power. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9202(1) (2003). See STULL, supra note 27, at 207 ("The
theoretical power available from the wind" is proportional to wind speed cubed.).
30 Wake Effects of Wind Turbines, DANISH WIND INDUS. Ass'N, http://
http://waubrafoundation.org.au/resources/wake-effects-wind-turbines-danish-
wind-industry-association/ (last visited Sept 21, 2015).
31 See STULL, supra note 27, at 212; PETER ATKINS & JULIO DE PAULA,
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 28-56 (8th ed. 2006) (reviewing the first law of
thermodynamics and how it governs the transformation of various forms of
energy within a bio-system).
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example, kinetic) to another (electric) "along any one streamline"
(such as a flowing river or a breeze), the sum of changes equals
zero.32 Therefore, harvesting the kinetic energy locked in the wind
through the turbine inevitably means there is less energy readily
available in the downwind direction.33
The size and shape of the wind wake depend on a variety of
factors, including the dimensions of the turbine itself and the
physical ground conditions.34 To illustrate this, initial data by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) suggests that an
average commercial wind turbine creates a wake that reaches
about 700 meters.35 The conjunction of several wind turbines,
which typically happens on a windfarm, creates an even more
dramatic effect: according to one study, the average wind wake
distance downwind of a large commercial wind farm can reach as
far as 60 km (approximately 36 miles).36
The airstream in wind wake areas is less suited for energy
32 STULL, supra note 27, at 211-12; see ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note 31
(reviewing the first law of thermodynamics and how it governs the
transformation of various forms of energy within a bio-system).
33 See STULL, supra note 27, at 212; DANISH WIND INDUS. Ass'N, supra note
30.
34 See generally STULL, supra note 27 (explaining the effects of ground
conditions).
35 NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL STUDIES WIND FARM
AERODYNAMICS TO IMPROVE SITING 1 (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fyl2osti/53609.pdf. Other sources claim that the wake will typically reach up to
eight to ten times the length of the turbines' diameter. Kimberly E. Diamond &
Ellen J. Crivella, Wind Turbine Wakes, Wake Effect Impacts, and Wind Leases:
Using Solar Access Laws as the Modelfor Capitalizing on Wind Rights During
the Evolution of Wind Policy Standards, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 195, 204
(2011); J.F. MANWELL ET AL., WIND ENERGY EXPLAINED: THEORY, DESIGN AND
APPLICATION 423 (2d ed. 2009); See also Diamond & Crivella, supra, at 204
(noting that "downwind wake effect from an individual commercial wind
turbine . . . can persist even longer where turbulence is low, such as in offshore
locations"). The size of turbines varies. The GE 1.5 megawatt model consists of
35-meter blades (70-meter diameters). See FAQ - Size, NATIONAL WIND WATCH,
www.wind-watch.org/faq-size.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Size
Specifications of Common Industrial Wind Turbines, AWEO, www.aweo.org/
windmodels.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). Other popular turbine models
have even longer blades of up to 45 meters (90-meter diameters). Id. Taken
together, if the wake is eight to ten times the size of the turbines, this means
these turbines can produce wakes of up to 720-900 meters.
36 See FRANDSEN ET AL., SUMMARY REPORT: THE SHADOW EFFECT OF LARGE
WIND FARMS: MEASUREMENTS, DATA ANALYSIS AND MODELLING 30 (2007),
www.risoe.dtu.dk/rispubl/reports/ris-r-1 615.pdf.
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production.37 A turbine located in another turbine's wake path has
less energy available for extraction38 and is "less efficient at
harvesting energy."39 The magnitude of this impact "is a function
of the number of turbines" upstream, as well as a range of
complicated interactions between the wakes created by all
preceding turbines.40 To illustrate this, some studies estimate that
the power output loss owing to wind-wakes could be about 10 to
20 percent; others suggest it can reach up to 40 percent.41
Overall, it is clear that the energy deficit from a wind wake is
quite significant. Thus, although wind has the ability to regenerate
over a certain time and distance, extracting energy from the wind
inevitably alters the current in the downwind direction, if only on a
local scale. Thus, I suggest that these wind wake effects could lead
to conflicts over the use of the existing wind resources, or more
specifically the use of the airborne kinetic energy locked in the
wind. Given the diminished kinetic energy in the downwind
direction, if a neighbor located downwind from turbines seeks to
construct a wind farm of her own, she would have less energy
37 Diamond & Crivella, supra note 35, at 200 ("[W]ind exiting a turbine
contains less kinetic energy than does wind before passing through a turbine.
This diminished, turbulent wind from an upwind turbine reduces the energy
entering downwind turbines, thereby decreasing the downwind turbines' overall
energy output.").
38 B. SANDERSE, AERODYNAMICS OF WIND TURBINE WAKES: LITERATURE
REVIEW 5 (2009), http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2009/e09016.pdf; R. J.
Barthelmie & L. E. Jensen, Evaluation of Wind Farm Efficiency and Wind
Turbine Wakes at the Nysted Offshore Wind Farm, 13 WIND ENERGY 573, 573
(2010) ("[W]ind speeds do not recover to their freestream value after
encountering the first turbine ... and thus are lower than the freestream ...
because kinetic energy has been extracted."); Diamond & Crivella, supra note
35, at 205 ("[D]ownwind turbines that experience wakes produce less power than
upwind turbines, particularly compared to upwind turbines that receive wind in
the freestream."); THOMAS E. KISSELL, INTRODUCTION TO WIND PRINCIPLES 274
(2010).
39 Diamond & Crivella, supra note 35, at 205. In addition to the reduced
wind speed, the downwind turbines also "experience increased mechanical loads
and diminished operational capacity" as "a result of vibration-induced fatigue on
these downwind" turbines. This is another factor which contributes to the
reduced power output of downwind turbines. Id. at 205-06.
40 Id at 204.
41 See NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, PREDICTING WIND POWER
WITH GREATER ACCURACY 9 (2014), available at https://str.lnl.gov/content/
pages/april-2014/pdf/04.14.1.pdf ("These wakes, which feature both reduced
wind speeds and increased turbulence, are of key concern because they are
associated with power losses of up to 40 percent, and they shorten the
operational life span of turbine components").
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potential than her upwind neighbor.42
Indeed, there is some initial evidence that such conflicts are
beginning to occur. For instance, in Alameda County, California,
two commercial developers seeking to construct wind farms on
adjacent plots came into conflict when the downwind developer
argued that the construction of a wind farm on the upwind land
would diminish the energy available on the downwind plot.43 A
similar conflict arose between two commercial developers in North
Dakota.44
Concerns over airborne kinetic energy have also been voiced
by a plaintiff in Illinois, arguing that constructing a wind farm on
42 Concerns over potential wind wake conflicts have also been mentioned by
Troy Rule, who notes that, "with the recent spike in demand for wind energy,
multiple developers are increasingly competing to develop wind energy projects
in the same geographic areas and are vying against each other for the same
wind .... In this competitive environment, an increase in wake interference
conflicts is bound to follow." Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the -Cathedral:
Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 214-15
(2009).
Non-profit organizations focused on wind energy development have also voiced
concerns about wind wake conflicts, noting that clear standards regarding the use
of wind are "critical to preventing disputes over wind rights now and in the
future," and absent such standards "conflicts among neighbors and among wind
developers can arise." WINDUSTRY WIND EASEMENT WORK GRP., WIND ENERGY
EASEMENTS AND LEASES: BEST PRACTICES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
3 (2005), http://www.windustry.org/sites/windustry.org/files/LandEBest-
Practices.pdf.
43 The downwind developers claimed that the construction of a wind farm on
the upwind plot would diminish the kinetic energy available to them for energy
production. They challenged the construction of the upwind farm on the grounds
that the local authorities were required to consider the effects of lost kinetic
energy on adjacent properties and failing to do so violated their obligations under
the California Environmental Quality Act. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21000-21177 (West 2014). The Superior Court accepted the claim, and an
appeal was filed to the California Court of Appeals (1st District San Francisco).
Telephone Interview with Howard Susman, Partner, Stoel Rives LLP (Oct. 4,
2012) (attorney for downwind developers). However, the case was eventually
settled out of court. Id. See Windpower Partners 1987 et al. v. County of
Alameda et al., No. A089107 (Cal. Ct. App. dismissed Nov. 27, 2000).
44 Florida Power and Light (FPL) had planned to install eighty commercial
size turbines in Barnes County, North Dakota. At the same time another
developer, Peak Wind, was also planning to develop a wind project downwind of
the FPL site. Peak Wind voiced concerns about the potential wind wake effect
that FPL's farm will create and the diminished returns it was likely to get on their
site as a result. Lauren Donovan, Two Energy Projects Competing for the Wind,
BISMARCK TRIB., (Feb. 22, 2008), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_
4bd1fld6-6616-512b-970f-b4301800f774.html. Apparently, a similar situation
also occurred in Dickey County, North Dakota. Id.
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the neighboring property would deprive her of "the full extent of
the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters her property."45
The same plaintiff recently brought another suit against the County
Board arguing against an "amendment to the County's zoning
ordinance"46 that eased the requirements for wind farm
construction; she claimed it would deprive her of the "'full
extent"' of the airborne kinetic energy.47 Judge Posner, writing for
the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that "[a] reduction in wind
speed downwind is an especially common effect of a wind
turbine."48 The issue of kinetic energy availability is also
addressed in the Contra Costa49 and Romero50 cases, which are
discussed in further detail below.
Concerns over wind wake effects are also reflected in state
and agency "setback" requirements, established with the purpose
of protecting the rights of downwind users.51 A setback is a
regulatory requirement that turbines be no less than a certain
distance from the property line. Minnesota adopted a statewide
setback requirement for siting turbines that "has been shown to
protect wind rights and future development options of adjacent
rights owners."52 And similarly, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) acknowledges wind wake effects and establishes a setback
45 Muscarello 'v. Ogle Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 610 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir.
2010). However, the case was dismissed on other grounds and the claim
regarding the wind wake effect was not discussed on the merits. Id. at 425
(concluding that claims were not ripe because no windmills had been built yet);
id. at 426 (discussing difficulties with federal jurisdiction in this case).
46 Muscarello v. Winnebago Cty. Bd., 702 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2012).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 911. In this case the court found that the ordinance-as such-had
not violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 913-14. However, the
court does not seem to rule out the option of future nuisance litigation against
any wind farm that might be constructed adjacent to plaintiffs property. Id. at
914-15.
49 Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
50 Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D.N.M. 2009).
51 As the examples below illustrate, "setbacks" or "wind access buffers" are
zoning restrictions that typically stipulate that wind turbines cannot be located at
a certain distance from property lines. See infra notes 102-104 and
accompanying text. By doing so, they seek to assure that neighboring property
will not receive a depleted wind current, since the setback provides a recovery
distance after the wind hits the turbine.
52 See Order Establishing General Wind Permit Standards, Docket No. E, G-
999/M-07-1102, 4 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Jan. 11, 2008). This setback also
applies to State lands. Id.
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requirement that is intended "to avoid potential wind turbulence
interference issues with adjacent wind energy facilities." 53
The wind wake dilemma can be especially problematic in
areas where wind resources are less abundant, where the use of the
wind is particularly competitive, and where the users are closer
together. As mentioned, wind has the ability to regenerate over a
certain distance, depending on the terrain and the friction it
encounters on the way.54 However, if the recovery period is too
short, the wind may never regain its speed.5 5 Therefore, the closer
the landowners are to one another, the more likely they are to
come into conflict over the use of wind.
An example of such a competitive environment could be
found in urban settings due to the recent expansion of distributed
generation56 or "small wind" projects.57 This trend is undoubtedly
53 Wind Energy Development Policy, Instruction Memorandum No. 2009-
043 (Dep't of Interior Bureau of Land Mgmt. Dec. 19, 2008). See also infra Part
II for discussion regarding the BLM wind rights regime.
54 The wind, like other moving forces, is affected by friction which slows it
down. Therefore, the frictional drag of trees, rocks, valleys or even buildings can
slow the wind down. See AHRENS, supra note 6, at 215.
55 This follows from the fact that the wind wake spans over a certain
distance. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The same idea is also
apparent in the setbacks, see infra notes 51, 98-101 and accompanying text that
purport to address the wind wake issues by distancing the turbines from property
lines.
56 Distributed generation "can be defined as electric power generation
occurring within distribution networks or on the customer side of the substation,
as opposed to occurring in the large, centralized generation facilities built outside
the distribution network on the transmission grid." Dennis L. Arfmann et al., The
Regulatory Future of Clean, Reliable Energy: Increasing Distributed
Generation, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2011, at 31, 31. See also Melissa Powers, Small Is
(Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to Increase Localized
Renewable Energy Generation, 30 Wis. INT'L L.J. 595, 599-603 (2012)
(discussing both the advantages and the challenges of distributed generation); see
generally DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2014 DISTRIBUTED WIND MARKET REPORT,
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/2014-Distributed-Wind-Mar-
ket-Report-8.7_0.pdf (discussing the growth trend in distributed wind
generation).
57 The term "small wind" typically refers to individual windmills, mostly
positioned on rooftops that generate no more than 100 kW. This definition is also
adopted by the Public Health and Welfare Act (chapter 100, Wind Energy
Systems), which provides that: "[T]he term 'small wind energy system' means a
wind energy system having a maximum rated capacity of one hundred kilowatts
or less." 42 U.S.C. § 9202(2) (2012). See also Christopher W. Fry, Note and
Comment: Harvesting the Sky: An Analysis of National and International Wind
Power, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 427, 436 (2008); Pursley &
Wiseman, supra note 1, at 890 (discussing the growth in small wind projects in
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desirable in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but it
may also result in increased conflicts over the use of wind." It may
be hard to imagine today, but consider a scenario in which a
turbine is positioned on every rooftop. The families living on the
downwind side of the neighborhood or the city are likely to suffer
from a drained wind current, and the effect could be reduced
energy output for these downwind families, analogous to building
too many dams on a river.
The urban locality could generate another type of wind-
related conflict resulting from the obstruction of wind rather than
its extraction. The production of energy from wind depends on
unobstructed access to their source.59 Therefore, constructing a
particularly tall or wide building might prevent the wind stream
from reaching houses in the downwind direction. While the
building does not harvest wind as turbines do, it still changes the
wind's course.60 Since the course of the wind is altered, its
availability for electricity production at a particular point
downstream is reduced. In other words, there could be potential
scarcity regarding the ability to access the resources, analogous to
diverting water from a river or stream.61
As a result, while the residents of the tall building can enjoy
the United States); AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, 2011 U.S. SMALL WIND TURBINE
MARKET REPORT 4 (2011), http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/201 I _AWEASmall_
Wind TurbineMarketReport.pdf. Based on average electricity consumption in
2013 [10,908 kWh per U.S. family], a 10 kW turbine could cover a family's full
yearly consumption. Frequently Asked Questions: How much electricity does an
American home use?, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t-3 ("In 2013, the average annual
electricity consumption for a U.S. residential utility customer was 10,908
kilowatt hours (kWh)."); See generally DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2014 DISTRIBUTED
WIND MARKET REPORT, http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/
2014-Distributed-Wind-Market-Report-8.7_0.pdf (discussing the growth trend in
distributed wind generation).
58 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59 See Megan Hiorth, Note, Are Traditional Property Rights Receding with
Renewable Energy on the Horizon?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 527, 528 (2010); see
also Wind Obstacles, DANISH WIND INDUS. ASS'N, http://www.motiva.fi/
myllarin tuulivoima/windpower/o20web/en/tour/wres/obst.htm (last updated
June 1, 2003).
60 Yael Lifshitz Goldberg, Comment, Gone with the Wind? The Potential
Tragedy of the Common Wind, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 435, 456 (2010)
(noting that "wind can likewise be altered due to man-made barriers, such as
buildings.... However, unlike buildings, wind turbines not only redirect and
decelerate the wind, they harvest it").
61 See Klass, supra note 1, at 80.
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the benefits of electricity produced from wind energy-or simply
enjoy the cool breeze-the downwind homes have less energy
potential and are forced to cool their houses using other means.
This again may lead to conflicts over the changing winds. In sum,
due to increased use of small wind turbines in neighboring
localities and the complexities associated with wind obstruction
resulting from urban construction, policy makers are likely to face
the challenges of wind management in the urban settings as well.
B. The Extraction ofEnergy Presents a Problem of Externalities
Wind wakes can be seen as a problem of externalities. Absent
any legal restrictions to the contrary,62 a farmer utilizing wind
resources to produce energy feels free to internalize the gains from
the production of such energy, but she is not required to shoulder
the burden caused by the depletion of the resource in the
downwind direction.63 Since wind users are entitled to enjoy the
profits of their capture without internalizing the costs, each
landowner has a strong incentive to continue using as much wind
as possible, without considering the impact on others, inevitably
harvesting more energy than is socially optimal.64
Similarly, the problem of externalities presents itself in the
urban setting as well. Just like the farmer has an incentive to
continue harvesting the wind, the building owner is encouraged to
place too many turbines. on her roof, or construct the tallest or
widest building in the city, without paying for her impact on the
wind.
While in some cases Coasean bargaining may be possible,65 in
62 See infra Part II (discussing the existing wind rights and the ways in which
they do or do not restrict harvesting the wind).
63 A lack of legal restrictions on the extraction of wind as such (as discussed
in Part II) implies that no legal mechanism levies the cost of the downwind
effects on those that harvest the wind resources.
64 See Lifshitz Goldberg, supra note 60, at 448 (discussing landowners'
incentives to engage in wind energy production). Relying on wind energy
reduces greenhouse gas emissions that would otherwise be produced by
traditional fossil-fuel energies. In that sense, wind energy is always beneficial.
However, maximizing social welfare involves a broader and more complex set of
considerations. The greenhouse gas reductions are only part of the overall
welfare analysis. This Note addresses that issue by arguing that we need to
account for a broader range of interests when considering turbine siting and the
use of wind in general.
65 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
448 Volume 23
WINDS OF CHANGE
most situations it is not likely to take place, due to the collective
action problem.66 Consider a situation in which a large wind farm
is located upwind of a city, causing the families in the downwind
location to receive a drained wind current. Assume also that, due
to the lack of breeze, the families in the downwind neighborhood
need to use artificial means to cool their homes. This phenomenon
is no doubt familiar to anyone that has ever lived in a warm
climate where the existence of a breeze can dramatically affect the
costs of air-conditioning. In theory, if the aggregated cost of air-
conditioning for all the downwind homes exceeds the benefits of
the windfarm, the families suffering from a lack of wind could
negotiate with the windfarm to stop its energy-producing
operations. However, due to problems of collective action, the
downwind families are less likely to do so.67 This would also be
true if the depleted breeze were to affect farmers' seed pollination
rather than household costs. The result is that the landowner could
in fact harvest the wind without accounting for either the costs
incurred by neighbors or the ecological effects of the energy
extraction.68
This situation is similar to the famous Tragedy of the
Commons created by the addition of too many cattle to a common
grazing field.69 Admittedly, there are some differences between a
grazing field and the wind: the grazing field cannot regrow if there
are no seeds left in the area. Wind, however, is regenerated by
differences in temperature created by the sun.70 Thus the renewal
66 The term 'collective action' generally refers to the difficulties of a
diffused group to organize and achieve a shared goal or manage a shared issue.
Collective action has been the subject of rich scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 22, 32-36 (1965) (identifying the negative correlation
between the number of participants in a collective enterprise and the likelihood
of their success in advancing a shared goal given the increased transaction costs
of identifying, organizing, and coordinating the large group); ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 183-84 (1990) (discussing how the size of the group implicates the
likelihood of resolving the problem of collective action). For consideration of the
Coasean roots of collective action problems, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew
L. Spitzer, The Enduring Power of Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. S63, S64-S65 (2011).
67 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68 See Part l.A.
69 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
70 See AHRENS, supra note 6, at 203-05; New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority, supra note 26 ("[T]he air moves in response to
pressure differences, or gradients, between different parts of the earth's surface.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2015 449
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
of wind does not depend on the existence of a minimum amount of
wind being present.71
However, it is important to understand that in the short tenn
and on a local scale, wind is not unlimited; it is exhaustible. Wind
can regenerate over a certain distance, but until it recovers, it may
be considerably slowed and, depending on the ground conditions,
may never have the chance to regain its speed.72 In practice,
recovery distance might be the determining factor for whether a
wind-use conflict arises.73 Consider what would happen to the
weather conditions or the pollination of seeds in the wake of a
windfarm. Alternatively, consider a similar (but opposite) example
given by Garrett Hardin, regarding the tragic tendency to create air
pollution.74 While we do not need a minimum amount of clean air
to create the next batch of clean air, the fact that the cost of
polluted air is shouldered by all, while most of the gains from
producing are enjoyed by few, creates an unfortunate tendency to
overuse our clean air resources. This may be true for our wind
resources as well: just like the tendency to put too much into the
air, there might be a tendency to extract too much out of the air.75
An air mass tends to move towards a zone of low pressure and away from a zone
of high pressure."). These differences in pressure are created by solar heating. Id,
("[A]ir pressure gradients .. . are continually being powered by uneven solar
heating of the earth's surface. When the surface heats up, the air above it
expands and rises, and the pressure drops. When there is surface cooling, the
opposite process occurs, and the pressure rises.").
71 Therefore, because the wind is recreated by differences in air temperature
due to the sun, in theory, we could extract all the energy from the wind such that
the air would be completely motionless, and new wind would eventually be
created, as long as the sun continued to heat the earth.
72 See supra Part 1.A.
73 This is because as the distance behind the turbine grows the effect of the
wake decreases. Diamond & Crivella, supra note 35, at 204 ("The further away a
downwind turbine is located from an upwind turbine, the less impact it
experiences in terms of wake loss and wind velocity deficit from the upwind
turbine.").
74 Hardin, supra note 66, at 1245. As opposed to the grazing example, with
pollution the tragic tendency is not to over-extract something from the common
resource (e.g. too much grazing), but rather excessive addition of something into
the commons. But just like in the grazing example, each user benefits from each
additional unit (in this case, of pollution) while shouldering only a fraction of the
overall cost of pollution. Since this is true for all users, we see the tragic
tendency to over-pollute. Id.
75 For further discussion, see also Lifshitz Goldberg, supra note 60
(discussing the wind as a common resource which could potentially be subject to
the commons dilemma).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
450 Volume 23
WINDS OF CHANGE
In contrast, altering wind currents could also create positive
externalities; in some locations, depleting or obstructing the wind
decreases the costs incurred by residents in, for example, heating
their homes. In cities, creating wind tunnels might actually
enhance the ability of some to produce wind-based electricity.76
However, this may also create conflicts over the use of wind, as
potential users vie for access to the tunnels. The point is that
constructing a building that changes the winds-whether by
extraction or obstruction-will be beneficial to some and
disadvantageous to others. Either way, the agent deciding to erect a
turbine or construct a building is not seeing the full impact of her
actions, whether positive or negative.
At the same time, the lack of clear wind-use rules could cause
underinvestment in the development of wind-resources.77 At
present, because of the uncertainties associated with the
uncontrolled use of wind, developers are concerned about their
ability to gain returns on their investments.78 This is true both for
upwind and downwind developers. The downwind developer may
worry that her upwind neighbor could diminish the wind available
to her. Once the turbines or buildings are constructed upwind, her
access to wind could be reduced, hindering her ability to produce
electricity and earn a return on her investment.79 The upwind
developer may also be worried that a downwind developer might
sue for the diminished kinetic energy. At present, due to the
uncertainties associated with the uncontrolled use of wind, the
upwind developer may fear that the risk of costly litigation is too
great and prefer not to invest in the turbines at all.80 The result is
that, given the risks currently involved for both downwind and
upwind developers, they might each end up foregoing an
opportunity to produce energy from the wind. Thus, the fact that
76 See, e.g., B. Blocken, T. Stathopoulos & J. Carmeliet, Wind Environmental
Conditions in Passages Between Two Long Narrow Perpendicular Buildings, 21
J. AEROSPACE ENG'G 280 (2008), http://sts.bwk.tue.hl/UrbanPhysics/pdf/
ASCE_BB_TS JC PREPRINT.pdf (noting that "passages between buildings
can be responsible for increased wind speed").
77 In fact, over-use and under-use can be seen as two sides of the same coin,
or symmetrical tragedies. Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J.
ON REG. 242, 245 (2005).
78 See, e.g., Rule, supra note 42, at 210 (discussing specifically the
uncertainties due to potential profit loss through lawsuits).
79 Id.
80 Id.
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potential investors cannot keep other users from preempting their
energy-producing activities might result in under-investment in the
capture of wind energy.
C. Wind Energy is Growing Rapidly
The complexities described above become all the more
pressing given recent growth in wind energy production. To
illustrate, in 2000 the overall installed (utility scale) capacity of
wind production in the United States was about 2500 MW.8' By
2013, the United States had 61,110MW of installed wind
capacity,82 which accounts for 4.1 percent of the of total U.S.
electricity supply.83 In fourteen years, the installed capacity
increased by nearly twenty-five times. And further growth can be
expected. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that by 2030
the United States could generate 20 percent. of its electricity from
wind power.84 More generally, in light of the geopolitical
complexities in oil-rich areas and the challenges of climate change,
the growth of wind power is likely to continue into the future. This
expected growth increases the management challenges that
policymakers are likely to face.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THE MECHANISM GOVERNING THE USE OF WIND
AT PRESENT
Despite the apparent importance of wind energy production
and, accordingly, the allocation of wind rights, there is a lack of
comprehensive legislative and judiciary guidance on this issue at
present. Lack of guidance as to the existing rights could lead to
wasteful practices or suboptimal investment in resource
81 20% Wind Energy by 2030, supra note 2. According to the NREL maps,
in 1999, the overall installed capacity in the US was 2,472 MW. U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, Wind and Water Program: WINDExchange, http://
www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind-installed-capacity.asp.
82 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, lEA WIND 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 5 TABLE 2
(Aug. 2014), http://www.ieawind.org/annual reportsPDF/2013/2013%20AR_
small 090114.pdf.
83 Id.
84 20% Wind Energy by 2030, supra note 2. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Wind
Vision, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing the wind energy potential in the United
States, noting that there are over "15,000 GW of technical wind resource
potential, both land-based and offshore, that can be harnessed and delivered
reliably").
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development." Therefore, it is imperative to closely examine
existing wind rights.
To clarify, this paper uses the terms 'property interests in
wind' or 'wind rights' to refer to a broad definition of property
interests, including a wide scope of wind-use rights created by the
courts, or by legislative or administrative institutions. This Note
does not aim to address other mechanisms that are sometime
employed with regards to wind energy production, such as tax
credits, loans, or renewable energy portfolios.86 These mechanisms
are government subsidies that provide generalized financial or
legal incentives to invest in renewable wind energy projects. In
comparison, the term 'wind rights' as used here refers to the
specific, inherent rights that one could have with respect to the
wind as it passes by. This includes, but is not limited to, the
extraction of the kinetic energy locked within the wind. The
inquiry into wind rights is primarily concerned with identifying the
emerging property regimes that have taken on a specific wind
aspect, such that they have created or recognized a specific right to
use the airborne kinetic energy. Thus, a wind right is one that has
specifically stated what he individuals' rights and obligations are
regarding the use of the airborne kinetic energy.87
Indeed, in several instances such interests in the wind itself
have been recognized by the legislature, the judiciary, and by
landowners themselves. The following section will briefly discuss
existing wind rights that recognize an individual's interests in the
flowing of air over her land. The analysis will proceed as follows:
first, the discussion will focus on the different forms of legislative
recognition of property interests in wind itself. It will then turn to
85 See supra Part .B for discussion regarding underinvestment.
86 For a review of some of these mechanisms currently in place, see Smith &
Diffen, supra note 19, at 167-76 (2010); Klass, supra note 1, at 95-96.
87 In that sense, it does not matter how we define the 'baseline.' What
matters is that we recognize a departure from the previous state of kinetic energy
in the wind. Such a definition also has the advantage of focusing solely on the
energy element of the wind. At the same time, it avoids the need to identify a
baseline, which could be a problematic issue in itself. Specifically, there can be
multiple relevant and applicable 'baselines,' including the notion of adcoelum or
analogies to other natural resources, such as oil and gas, wildlife, and sunlight.
See supra note 25. Each of these options has some advantages, although applying
each regime may produce different outcomes. The main point is that, absent a
specific recognition of one baseline or the other, it is impossible to determine
which one of these regimes would apply. The 'baseline,' in so far as it exists, is
not clear at present.
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highlight some of the cases of judicial recognition of wind rights
and will discuss wind rights on federal lands. Lastly, the discussion
will briefly note the existence of wind leases which could attest to
a de facto existence of property interests in wind.
The legislative recognition of wind rights takes on different
forms. In some cases, it is explicit. Perhaps the most explicit
potential legislative expression of a property right in wind can be
found in Colorado, which introduced a bill providing that "the
wind interest" is "the right to use, convert, maintain, and capture
the flow of wind currents."88 If this bill were enacted, Coloradoans
could assert a strong, explicit ownership right. Legislation has also
addressed the lease of wind rights; a few states have explicitly
acknowledged the ability to lease the right to use airborne kinetic
energy in the wind. Montana,89 South Dakota,90 Nebraska,91 and
Kansas92 recognize the practice of wind leasing via statute,
although such a practice is not formally endorsed in most states.
In several other instances, the legislative recognition of wind
rights is less explicit. In such cases, the application of property
rights to the wind resources often relies on existing common law
property mechanisms. For instance, property rights in the wind
sometimes take the form of easements, such that a farmer holding
a wind easement can ensure continued and unobstructed access to
the resource. Wind easements protect, for example, the property
owner's ability to install a wind turbine without worrying about a
tall building being constructed in the upwind direction that could
block her wind. By doing so, the easements can ensure the
viability of investment in the development of wind energy
production or simply preserve the continuous flow of air for
purposes of cooling her home. Such easements would be
88 H.R. 1158 §3(3), 2010 Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2010). The wind interest is
initially the property of the surface owners and "is a property right that can be
severed from the surface ownership." Id.; see also Smith & Diffen, supra note
19, at 177 (discussing the Colorado bill).
89 Although the "wind energy agreement" is recognized in conjunction with a
wind-easement. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-402 (2011).
90 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-13-16 to -19 (2004 & Supp. 2009) (although
the right can only be established by lease for no longer than 50 years and a lease
of wind energy rights automatically terminates at the end of five years if no
development has occurred). See also Diamond & Crivella, supra note 35, at 239-
41 (discussing the bill).
91 NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-909.04 (2011) (defining a "wind agreement" as a
"right . .. securing land for the study or production of wind-generated energy.").
92 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2272 (2005).
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analogous to the traditional common law easements for light and
air.93 Wind easements, however, are currently only endorsed by
legislation in a few states. Oregon provides that a "wind energy
easement" is "any easement, covenant or condition designed to
insure the undisturbed flow of wind across the real property of
another."94 Similar easements also exist in Montana,95 South
Dakota,96 North Dakota,97 Nebraska,9 8 Kansas,99 Minnesota,'00 and
Wisconsinto with slight variations.
Other mechanisms that are occasionally used to protect the
interest in the flowing of wind on one's land are zoning and siting
systems. The siting systems provide for wind protection by
defining 'setback' or 'wind access buffer' provisions, which.
protect the interest in free-flowing wind by prohibiting turbine
installation within a certain distance of property borders. This can
assure that the neighboring properties will not receive a depleted
wind current, since the setback provides a recovery distance after
93 See Smith & Diffen, supra note 19, at 186.
94 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.900.
95 Defining an easement as "the right granted by the owner of real
property . . . guaranteeing the developer the right to use the real property legally
described in a wind energy agreement and the wind resource located on and
flowing over its surface" (MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-402 (2011)).
96 Defining a wind easement as "a right, whether or not stated in the form of
a restriction, easement, covenant, or condition .. . for the purpose of ensuring
adequate exposure of a wind power system to the winds" S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
43-13-16 to -19 (2004 & Supp. 2009). Although such easements are limited to a
term of no more than fifty years, and are void "if no development of the potential
to produce energy from wind power' occurs on the benefited land within five
years of the grant of the easement." Id.
97 See N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 17-04-02 to -03 (2009) (similar to South Dakota,
the easement is also void if substantial steps towards an operable wind farm on
the benefited land have not been taken within five years of granting the
easement); see also Smith & Diffen, supra note 19, at 187.
98 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-909.04 (2012) ("[W]ind energy easement shall
mean any easement, covenant or condition designed to insure the undisturbed
flow of wind across the real property of another."); see also Klass, supra note 1,
at 102-03.
99 See KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-2272 (2005).
100 MINN. STAT. § 500.30 (2010) (providing that a "'wind easement' means a
right ... executed by or on behalf of any owner of land or air space for the
purpose of ensuring adequate exposure of a wind power system to the winds").
101 Wis. STAT. § 700.35 (providing for a "renewable energy resource
easement," which "limits the height or location, or both, of permissible
development on the burdened land in terms of a structure or vegetation, or both,
for the purpose of providing access for the benefited land to wind or sunlight
passing over the burdened land").
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the wind hits the turbine. Such a setback provision has been
adopted in Minnesota, which stipulates a "wind access buffer" 02
explicitly intended to "protect wind rights and future development
options of adjacent rights owners."l03 Setback provisions for wind
installations have also been adopted at the local level by several
counties.104
In several instances courts have recognized wind as a
severable interest, separate from the ownership of the land itself. In
the earliest case discussing the existence of wind rights, Choctaw,
Oklahoma & Texas Railroad Co. v. True,0 5 the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas implicitly recognizes wind rights.10 6 The
plaintiffs sought damages for the construction of an embankment
adjacent to their property.0 7 Evidence of the embankment's
interference with plaintiffs ability to use the windmill was found
to be relevant to demonstrating damages.08 Although the court did
not explicitly discuss wind rights, the fact that such interests were
acknowledged and separately protected suggests a de facto
recognition of wind rights and their value.109
102 Providing that turbines cannot be built within a certain distance from "the
adjacent property border." See Order Establishing General Wind Permit
Standards, supra note 52.
103 Id. It is also meant "to protect the wind and property rights of persons
outside the permitted project boundary and persons within the project boundary
who are not participating in the project." Id. This setback also applies to State
lands. Id.
104 The U.S. Dep't of Energy offers a catalogue of wind energy ordinances,
totaling 381 as of October 2015. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Efficiency &
Renewable Energy, Wind Energy Ordinances, http://apps2.eere.energy.gov/
wind/windexchange/policy/ordinances.asp#links. For example, in Monterey
County California, the ordinance controlling the installation of "wind energy
conversion systems" stipulates that they "shall maintain a minimum setback of
two times the total height of the Wind Energy Conversion System from any
property line." MONTEREY COUNTY, CAL. ZONING ORDINANCE 21, 21.64.120,
§2(a). And as mentioned, similar provisions exist in many other counties across
the US. Yet it is not unclear whether they are indeed intended to protect the free
flowing wind or rather they are concerned with protecting other interests such as
noise, and view.
105 Choctaw, Okla. & Tex. R. Co. v. True, 80 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App.
1904).
106 Thaddeus Baria, Comment, Up the Creek with a Paddle: Water Doctrine
as a Basis for Small Wind Energy Resource Rights, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 141, 153
(2009) (discussing the case).
107 Id. (citing True, 80 S.W. at 121).
108 Id. (citing True, 80 S.W. at 121).
109 See id.
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Later cases have recognized a more explicit right to the .wind
over one's land. In Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms,
Inc.,1 0 the California Court of Appeal (First District) recognized
wind as an explicit severable property interest. The case involved a
taking of land on which wind power facilities were installed. The
court was called upon to consider the following question: "When a
public entity acquires property through eminent domain, are the
windpower rights capable of segregation or are they so affixed to
the underlying land that they must be acquired by the condemning
authority?""' The court found that "windpower rights are
'substantial rights' capable of being bought and sold in the
marketplace,""12 holding that these rights where much like rights in
other energy-producing minerals, such as oil and gas.113 The court
therefore recognized a right to the flow of wind, separate from the
right to the land itself.
Although the Contra Costa holding could be seen as limited
to eminent domain proceedings,114 subsequent case law suggests
that other courts have taken a similar understanding regarding
interests in wind. In 2009, the question of wind rights was
addressed by the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico in Romero v. Bernell."5 The respondent, opposing the
partitioning of a parcel of land owned by tenants in common,
"argued that the land could not be partitioned" because the main
"value of the land was in wind farm development," and
partitioning the land would diminish that value.116 Instead of
drawing an analogy to minerals, the Romero court compared water
with wind as a severable property interest."I However, the court
110 Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, 58 Cal. App. 4th 883, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272
(1997).
111 Id. at 276.
112 Id. at 277.
113 Id. at 278 (agreeing with the Water District that "[t]he right to generate
electricity from windmills harnessing the wind ... is no different, either in law or
common sense, from the right to pump and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface
natural gas").
114 See Smith & Diffen, supra note 19, at 177; Alexander, supra note 2, at
453.
115 Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-36 (D.N.M. 2009).
116 Alexander, supra note 2, at 453 (citing Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d. at 1334).
The respondent further argued that "wind power rights, like mineral rights, are
not capable of being partitioned." Alexander, supra note 2, at 453 (quoting
Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1334) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d. at 1334-35; Alexander, supra note 2, at 453; see
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limited the wind right only to cases where the wind has actually
been captured."8 The court found that "[t]he right to 'harvest'
wind energy is . .. an inchoate interest in the land which does not
become 'vested' until reduced to 'possession' by employing it for
a useful purpose."119 In this case, since there were no actual wind
turbines on the property, the court found that the wind interest had
not yet materialized and ordered the division of the property.120 In
other words, the Romero court recognizes severable wind rights,
though such rights only materialize when the wind is captured for
a "useful" or "beneficial purpose."21
Despite these promising cases, there is otherwise very little
jurisprudence on the severability of wind rights. The few
adjudicated cases that pertain to wind energy installations are
typically concerned with the noise or aesthetics of the turbines, or
even the wellbeing of the wildlife in the region, but are mostly not
concerned with the extraction of the kinetic energy itself as a
separate protectable interest.122
In addition to wind rights at the state level, there is also an
interesting example regarding the right to use wind blowing over
federal lands. The BLM "manages 20.6 million acres of public
lands" that are blessed with wind-energy potential.123 Yet the
agency does not install turbines nor harvest the wind itself. Rather,
also Alexander, supra note 2, at 453 n.193 ("New Mexico applies prior
appropriation to both its surface water and its groundwater, and an interest in
groundwater is severable.").
118 Alexander, supra note 2, at 453.
119 Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
120 Alexander, supra note 2, at 453 (citing Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-
36).
121 Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-36; see also Alexander, supra note 2, at
453 (discussing the Romero case). Interestingly, this holding could arguably be
influenced by the court's understanding of wind as similar to water appropriative
water rights, as discussed below.
122 See, e.g., Rankin v. FPL Energy L.L.C., 266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.
2008) (rejecting nuisance suit filed by neighbors of a proposed wind farm that
were concerned with loss of view and noise); Finger Lakes Pres. Ass'n v. Town
Bd. of Italy, 887 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (dismissing residents' claims
pertaining to the siting process and the noise created by the turbines); Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Ct. App. 2008)
(rejecting environmental group complaints regarding impacts on birds); see also
Klass, supra note 1, at 106-07 (discussing further cases that demonstrate this).
123 U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, BLM Fact
Sheet-Renewable Energy: Wind (2015), http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/
medialib/blmI/wo/MINERALS REALTYANDRESOURCEPROTECTIO
N_/energy.Par.22758.File.dat/Wind06 2012.pdf.
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it provides private contractors with rights of way to do so, which
are essentially permits to extract wind for energy production
purposes at a given location, under certain restraints.124
Interestingly, the right of way also includes a setback
requirement stipulating a minimum distance that a turbine must be
located from the boundary "in the dominant upwind or downwind
direction" and specifically states that this setback aims "to avoid
potential wind turbulence interference issues with adjacent wind
energy facilities." 25 Thus, the BLM rights of way specifically
account for the wind wake effects, and establish a setback
requirement to avoid such interferences and the potential harm to
downwind right-holders.
Lastly, another factor that could attest to the existence of wind
rights is the de facto treatment of wind as a protectable interest in
the contracts landowners are making with developers to lease the
use of their wind. These contracts typically do not aim to transfer
ownership of the entire property,126 but rather aim only to facilitate
124 All rights of way, whether for testing or energy production, are subject to
a fee as stipulated by the BLM. Authorization under the right of way applies to
the right to extract wind for energy production and extends to the development of
all facilities which are related to the production of wind energy, such as the
turbines and electric distribution facilities. INSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM No.
2009-043, WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POLICY, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR (2008), http://www.blm.gov/
wo/st/en/info/regulations/Instruction Memos and Bulletins/national instruction
/2009/IM_2009-043.html. Certain aspects of the rights-of-way application
process are currently under review. The BLM has published a proposed rule that
amends the procedures for the entering into leases and the incentives to install in
specific areas ('designated leasing areas'). Competitive Processes, Terms, and
Conditions for Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development
and Technical Changes and Corrections, 79 Fed. Reg. 189 (Sept. 30, 2014).
125 See Instruction Memorandum, supra note 124 at [part 3 titled
"Development Grant"]. There are two exceptions to this limitation. First, "unless
it can be demonstrated that site conditions, such as topography, natural features,
or other conditions such as offsets of turbine locations, warrant a lesser
distance." Id. at part 3 (titled "Development Grant"). Second, "[i]n cases where
the applicant holds a long-term lease right on adjacent Federal or non-Federal
lands for wind energy development or the adjacent non-Federal landowner
provides a setback waiver." Id. The setback requirement was not amended by the
recent rulemaking. E-mail from Ray A. Brady, BLM Renewable Energy Policy
Team, Jun. 23, 2015, 2:38PM PST (on file with author) ("[T]he setbacks are still
in place by policy guidance. They will not be established by regulation as they
may change overtime, but will be carried forward in policy guidance.").
126 See, e.g., ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., TEXAS WIND LAW § 3.02 (2013)
("[L]andowners executing wind leases often include provisions expressly
reserving their rights to use the land for other uses, such as farming, ranching, oil
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the extraction of wind for energy production,127 thus asserting a de
facto property interest therein. It is nearly impossible to precisely
determine the popularity of such wind leases, yet several
practitioners have written about the widespread phenomenon of
wind leasing,128 and industry representatives have also attested to
the widespread popularity of these leasing practices in recent
interviews.129
Looking at the current wind rights (or lack thereof), whether
established through the legislative or judicial systems, it becomes
apparent that the rights to use the energy locked in the wind have
and gas exploration, and hunting.").
127 See, e.g., Gregory S. Friend, A Tale of Two Uses: Landowner Perspectives
on Wind Leasing and Transmission Easements (conference presentation at
Wind, Solar and Renewables Fundamentals conference, sponsored by the
University of Texas School of Law, 7-8 (2010), http://
www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/FriendWE10_paper.pdf (noting that wind
leases often list specifically the activities a developer may engage in, which
include access the property, free flow of wind over the property, install
transmission lines and conduct studies, and that the landowner "generally ...
possess[es] the rights to utilize the property in the manner it had been used
previously, so long as that activity does not interfere with the rights granted to
the developer"); WINDUSTRY, WIND ENERGY EASEMENT AND LEASE
AGREEMENTS 6-7 (2005), http://www.windustry.org/sites/windustry.org/files/
LandEMain.pdf (discussing rights typically given to developers under wind
leases and rights reserved for landowners); see generally LISA CHAVARRIA, THE
SEVERANCE OF WIND RIGHTS IN TEXAS (2008), http://sbaustinlaw.com/library-
papers/Chavarria-TheSeveranceof Wind Rights%20%28Final%29.pdf. For
instance, a Texas treatise on Wind Law proposes a model wind-lease agreement
which suggests that the purpose of the lease be defined as "solely and exclusively
for wind energy purposes, and not for any other purpose." SMITH ET AL., supra
note 126, at app. 2. In addition, under the proposed model agreement, the
"landowner reserves the right to use the Property for any purpose (including but
not limited to agricultural, ranching, hunting, and oil and gas development)." Id
at § 3.02. The perpetual aspect of the wind lease is another indication of the
strong property notion that these agreements take on. See .id at § 3.02 (noting
that typically "any subsequent lessee of land subject to a wind lease takes subject
to the wind lease").
128 This is especially true in areas where the production of wind energy is
prevalent, such as Texas. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 440-41 (noting
that severance of wind rights through leases has become "common practice");
Chavarria, supra note 127, at 2. Interestingly, practitioners also note that,
although in several instances contractual disputes over various issues within the
wind leases have come before the courts, to date, the validity of the wind leases
themselves has not been questioned neither by the parties to the dispute nor by
the courts. Id.
129 Telephone Interview with Randy Sowell, Manager Fremantle Energy LLC
(Sept. 27, 2012); Telephone Interview with Joe Sullivan, Regional Policy
Manager, West (Oct. 2, 2012).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
460 Volume 23
WINDS OF CHANGE
yet to be fully developed. As this Note illustrates through the
review of current wind rights, the governance of wind resources is
still underdeveloped. It is, therefore, imperative to further examine
the question of how we should manage wind. One way to answer
this question is by employing an analogy to a similarly fugitive
and stream-like asset: water.
III. WHY COMPARE TO WATER?
Wind and water are similar in many ways, especially in their
,flowing, stream-like behavior. Both these assets flow along
(mostly) defined routes, such as canyons and creeks, or the
prevailing wind patterns. They each have a unique role in the
ecosystem: they assist reproduction by carrying seeds and other
organisms on their way; their force assists fish and birds in
travelling across great distances; and they slowly shape the
landscape by carrying along trees, soil, and rocks. Furthermore,
both resources are blessed with the potential to produce electricity
by converting the kinetic energy locked in the stream into electric
energy.130 Lastly, the kinetic energy in both resources is
renewable: the movement of air is recreated over and over by the
recurring differences in air pressure,13' and the water cycle Will
continue given the repeated rain patterns.132 Accordingly, wake-
130 Interestingly, a similar analogy between wind and water was also drawn by
the District Court for the District of New Mexico, which found that wind, as
compared to minerals, is not found in a set place, but rather is more analogous to
flowing water. See Romero v. Bemell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-35 (D.N.M.
2009) (comparing the right to extract wind energy to the right to appropriate
surface water and groundwater under New Mexico's prior appropriation regime);
see also supra Part II.
131 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
132 Note the distinction between the renewability of the kinetic energy and the
availability of clean resources. The latter refers to either clean air or clean water
(for example drinking water). The fact that kinetic energy in either water or wind
is renewable does not mean that the clean water or clean air supplies are also
replenishable. Also note that, while the total water supply on earth is renewable,
specific bodies of water may not be. For example, if you over-extract an aquifer
beyond the annual safe yield, it will be depleted. For a basic explanation of the
earth's water cycle see THE WATER CYCLE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); The
Water Cycle, NAT'L AERONAUTICS SPACE ADMIN., http://aquarius.umaine.edu/
cgi/gal movies.htm?id=69&type=ed (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). For an
assessment of the renewable fresh water on earth see The World Bank,
Renewable Internal Freshwater Resources Per Capita, WORLDBANK.ORG,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H20.1NTR.PC/countries/1 W?display-ma
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related problems-which are the focus of this paper-appear in
both resources in a similar manner: an upstream user creates a
wake that detracts the amount of kinetic energy available to
downstream users. In the case of water, this may be due to a dam
on a river; with regards to wind, it could be from a turbine or a
building.
Moreover, both resources are essentially common pool
resources. Such resources are non-excludable (or excludable at a
prohibitively high cost), yet are "rivalrous" in the sense that the
use of one can diminish the potential use by others.133 Excluding
users from accessing a large river or lake is difficult, making the
water essentially non-excludable. The use of these bodies of water,
for purposes such as irrigation or industry, causes other users to
have less water available, making water rivalrous as well.134
Similarly, as discussed above, it is hard to exclude users from
enjoying a breeze, yet the wind is diminished when it is harvested
for its energy such that its use by one decreases the amount of
wind available for others. Taken together, both wind and water are
relatively hard to fence and difficult to control, yet the extraction
of parts of the resource leave less available for others.
Since both wind and water are common pool resources, they
face some of the same problems regarding shared resource
management and property allocation. For instance, common pool
resources are typically subject to problems of overuse.135 Thus,
exploring the lessons learned from governing the common waters
p(last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
133 Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the
Sea, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 571 (2010) ("[a] common pool resource has two
defining characteristics: no single actor has established control over it;. and the
consumption of the resource is to some degree 'rivalrous,' meaning that when
one actor consumes the resource, its quantity or quality is diminished for other
potential consumers") (citations omitted); see generally ELINOR OSTROM ET AL.,
RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994).
134 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption and Water Law
Reform, 15 WIDENER. L. REV. 409, 419 (2010) (discussing rivalrous goods).
135 See generally COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND
COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989)
(outlining the challenges of common resource management); ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990) (discussing common resource management); Martin S.
Weinstein, Pieces of the Puzzle: Solutions for Community-Based Fisheries
Management from Native Canadians, Japanese Cooperatives, and Common
Property Researchers, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 376 (2000) (discussing
community based management).
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might be beneficial in the efforts to tailor a regime to govern the
common winds.
Furthermore, the term 'wind rights' as used in this paper,
refers to the use of the wind as it passes by, including the
extraction of the kinetic energy locked within it. The term is thus
similar to water rights in the sense that it does not provide the
owner with possession over the resource itself, but rather the right
to use or extract the resources for her benefit. The similar nature of
the property interests in wind and water thus provides another
reason for looking at water regimes in the efforts to shape wind
law.
Admittedly there are some differences between water and
wind. Notably, water is crucial for human survival. While the
movement of air is immensely important to the ecosystem as a
whole, air movement is not necessary for human survival in the
narrow sense.136 This difference may influence the way in which
we perceive and manage the resources. Moreover, water is used for
a wider range of purposes than wind. Water uses range from
domestic needs and recreation, to agricultural irrigation and
industrial purposes, to energy production. Given this diversity of
uses, conflicts over water are more likely to arise. Significant
conflicts can arise simply from two industrial installations drawing
water for production purposes from the same stream, two farmers
using water for their crops, or a city relying on a river for drinking
water.13 7 Put differently, the wide range of uses, coupled with the
necessity of water for human survival, makes the conflicts over the
use of water resources more likely and more frequent.
Wind is not currently employed for such a wide range of uses.
However, as previously discussed, wind does play an important
role in our lives in many ways that may not be visible to us. Wind
is used for several important purposes, such as electricity
production, cooling homes, seed pollination, and kite-flying. 138 All
136 Naturally some elements of the air, namely oxygen, are essential for
human survival, but the movement of air itself, i.e., wind, is not necessary for
human survival.
137 See, for instance, the cases and examples discussed below in Part IV,
which demonstrate the conflicts between competing users, as they attempt to
harness water for industrial, domestic, agricultural, or energy production
purposes.
138 Recreational activity is important and could sometimes be prioritized over
other uses. Following the analogy to water, imagine preserving the water flow in
the river to allow for boating, swimming, kayaking and more. .A similar
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these activities eventually compete with each other for wind use.
Therefore, while the frequency of the conflicts over resources may
differ, the fact that such conflicts over competing uses arise in both
resources is enough to suggest that analogizing between the two
could be fruitful.
Lastly, employing the analogy to water is not meant in any
way to suggest that water regimes should be adopted "as is" to
govern wind. The analogy merely serves as an analytical tool,
helping us examine various ways to protect and govern wind. The
maturity of water law in the U.S. provides an opportunity to
choose from a menu of options, browsing the different regimes and
considering whether they may be applicable to wind. Therefore,
although wind and water no doubt exhibit some distinct physical
differences, they are also similar in many ways that can be relevant
to the analysis of property interests, including their stream-like
behavior, their fugitive fluid nature, their ecological importance,
and their properties as common pool resources. Drawing
comparisons from the well-developed water law in the United
States could thus produce particularly helpful lessons in crafting
wind law.
IV. DRAWING ON WATER REGIMES TO CRAFT WIND LAW
Absent transaction costs, the Coase theorem stipulates that the
initial allocation of wind rights will not change the final outcome,
as parties will voluntarily enter into efficient transactions.139
However, because current law causes great uncertainties regarding
the allocation of interests in wind, and because of strategic
behavior, problems of collective action, information asymmetries,
and other transaction costs, Coasean bargaining is not likely to
take place.140 The allocation of wind resources and their
governance will therefore impact the sum of wind available for
energy productionl41 and the costs of the regime, as well as the
potential overuse of common resources. Similarly, property
relations between individuals will impact the ways in which the
reasoning could apply to wind.
139 See generally Coase, supra note 65; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 82-87 (3rd ed., 2000).
140 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
141 The availability for energy production is impacted by where the turbines
are sited, as discussed in Part I above.
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resource is used.142 Examining interests in wind through the lens of
analogous water law regimes is thus particularly interesting.
The creation of water law and the allocation of rights to use
water in the U.S. are traditionally governed by state law.143
Varying conditions and communities in different geographic
regions birthed several vastly different approaches to water
allocation rights.144 The following analysis will survey four water
regimes that have developed in the United States. Each one of
these regimes is a world of its own, embodying nuances and
intricacies that exceed the scope of this Note. The following
analysis will portray the water regimes in broad strokes, outlining
only the key structures of each regime to enable assessment of its
overall applicability to the wind regimes. The analysis will attempt
to determine their relative merits and their suitability to facilitate
efficient development of the wind.
A. Riparianism
1. Riparian Water Regimes
A riparian regime provides for the allocation of water
depending on land ownership and the reasonable purpose for
which the water is used. It is based on the notion that the right to
use the water on the property is a natural attribute of land.145 Such
land-adjoining or underlying water-is known as "riparian
land."l 4 6
142 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 420.
143 However, some scholars have argued recently that water law has, and
should be, shifted more to the federal realm. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate
Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 1 (2010)
(arguing that due to the expected water shortages and related challenges the US
is likely to face as a result of climate change, water law should be moved more
into the federal jurisdiction). See generally David H. Getches, The
Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local
Decisions Eclipsed The States'Role?, 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 5 (2001) (discussing
changes in Federal involvement in water law).
144 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the adoption of riparianism in eastern
states); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the prior appropriation regime in
western states).
145 See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16 (4th ed. 2009).
146 The Restatement Second of Torts defines riparian land as a "tract of land
that borders on a w'atercourse or lake." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §843
(AM. LAW INST. 1979). The restatement further explains that the significance of
the riparian land is that "a person in possession of the land has certain rights and
privileges in relation to the water that other persons do not have or do not have to
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Riparianism is often seen as analogous to a community
property right, in the sense that only insiders to that community,
"co-owners," can access the resources, whereas outsiders are
excluded from using the resource.147 As co-owners, community
members can decide if "and how to use the resource."48 The
protection of rights under this system typically involves
adjudication in which the court examines the co-owners' decision
to use the water and its impact on other members of the same
community. 149
Riparianism developed mostly in the eastern states in the
United States, where people considered water resources to be
readily available and where generally there was little or no water
shortage.' Today, about half of the eastern states continue to rely
on a traditional riparian regime to allocate the waters within the
state among users.'5 '
As mentioned, allocating water through a riparian system
means that landowners adjacent to a body of water have a right to
reasonably use the waters. The "reasonable use rule" adopted by
the courts allows each riparian landowner to use water as long as
her use does not violate the rights of other similarly positioned
riparian landowners.152 A central question in applying riparian
the same extent." Id. Dellapenna, supra notel34, at 421. See also Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (stating that "the
natural stream . .. is an incident annexed, by operation of law, to the island
itself"). This opinion is often cited as the first riparian case. Id. For a more
contemporary expression of the notion that riparian rights are a natural attribute
of the land bordering a watercourse, see Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Cutler,
492 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139-40 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd mem., 492 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y.
1986); see also GETCHES, supra note 145, at 24-30 (discussing what constitutes
riparian land and the different types of riparian lands such as lakes, streams,
artificial watercourses and underground watercourses); see also id, at 30-35
(discussing, for example, whether riparian rights can attach to as lands outside
the watershed).
147 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 423.
148 Id. (noting that the case of Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark.
1955) is illustrative of this).
149 Id. at 423-25 (discussing examples of adjudicating riparian rights).
150 Id. at 413-14.
151 See infra Part IV.C (discussing the eastern states that have shifted to
regulated riparianism).
152 See GETCHES, supra note 145, at 48-49 (reviewing the case law that
applies the reasonable use rule). As Professor Dellapenna notes, today "apart
from a preference for domestic uses, the only real restriction is that a use is not
lawfull [sic] if it 'unreasonably harms' another's riparian use." Dellapenna,
supra note 134, at 422 (citation omitted). An early case which discussed "the
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water rights is thus the "reasonableness" of the use, which is
determined through a contextual, fact-specific analysis.153 It is
essentially a comparative analysis, comparing the fact pattern at
allocation of water in terms of ... riparian rights" was Merritt v. Parker, which
involved a dispute over competing uses between a watermill and a dam. Id.
(citing 1 N.J.L. 526 (1795)). For similar early cases, see id. at 422 n.80 (citing
Cooper v. Hall, 5 Ohio 320, 323 (1832); Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288, 296
(1845); Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786, 788-89 (Conn. 1888); Heath v. Williams, 25
Me. 209 (Me. 1845); Pratt v. Lamson, 84 Mass. 275 (2 Allen) 275 (Mass.
1861); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580, 582 (N.H. 1863); Red River Roller Mills
v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249,15 N.W. 167, 168 (Minn. 1883); Farrell v. Richards, 30
N.J. Eq. 511, 515 (N.J. Ch. 1879); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R.308 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805); Howell v. McCoy, 3 Rawle 256, 269 (Pa. 1832); Richmond Mfg. Co.
v. Atl. De Laine Co., 10 R.I. 106, 111 (R.I. 1871)).
153 The Second Restatement of Torts identifies several factors that should be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the use. These include: the
purpose of the use; the suitability of the use to the watercourse or the lake;
economic value of the use; social value; the extent and amount of harm caused;
practicability of avoiding harm; protection of existing values of water uses and
investments; and the justice of requiring the use causing harm to bear the loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §850 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Although some scholars have noted that while the Second Restatement
allows for considering a wide range of factors, courts tend to give only minimal
attention to non-economic questions such as the natural flow of the stream, social
concerns, or notions of abstract justice. See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 423
(noting that although such social concerns feature in the Restatement hey are not
dominant in the case law). Mostly, courts will rely on the economic value of the
competing uses. Such was the case, for example, in Harris. 283 S.W.2d at 136.
In particular, the use of water for generating electricity is a well-
recognized riparian use, which will generally be considered reasonable,
depending on the storage and release methods, the stream size, the state of
technology employed, and the uses of the stream by other riparian land-holders.
Interestingly, although the riparian doctrine generally limits water use to the
riparian land itself, electricity produced from hydroelectric dams are allowed to
be transmitted and used by non-riparian users as well. See GETCHES, supra note
145, at 41-42. One limitation on the ability to harness the water for energy
production is the prohibition on constructing dams on navigable water unless
authorized by the Federal Government. See id. at 41-42 (referring to the Federal
Power Act). However, a similar result seems to follow from the fact that
navigable waters are generally owned by the states and not private riparian
landowners. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, et al., NATURAL RESOURCE LAW: A
PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 633 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that
"navigable" waters are generally held by states under the public trust doctrine);
see id. at, 632-43. (discussing the scope of "navigability" in different contexts);
Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State
Environmental Rights Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENVTL. L. 431, 432-33 (2015)
("The public trust doctrine ... provides that states must hold certain natural
resources, particularly submerged lands under tidal and navigable waters.");
Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702-06 (2006) (discussing
the origins of the public trust doctrine and its applicability to navigable waters).
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hand with the uses of other riparian right holders.154 This makes
the analysis of "reasonableness" highly flexible, since it relies
primarily on a comparative utility. Moreover, since courts are
required to continuously re-evaluate the results in light of changing
prices and realities, their assessment could also be subject to
adjustments over time.155
2. Applying the Traditional Riparian Regime to Wind Resources:
Creating Riparian- Wind Rights
Applying a riparian-like regime to wind resources might first
entail establishing 'riparian-wind-lands.'l56  For example,
landowners underlying a strong wind current would have a right to
reasonably use energy within the wind stream howling over their
land. Notably, under such a regime the use of wind would depend
on land ownership. The reasonability of the use would also need to
be determined: the extraction of energy would be weighed against
other uses to determine the reasonability of the energy production.
Such a wind-riparian regime would be helpful in the sense
that it is intuitive; it follows from the existing land patterns and is
fairly easy to establish from an institutional perspective.
Furthermore, a riparian-like regime exists de facto in some areas
today, under which landowners feel free to utilize the wind
howling over their lands. In Colorado, for example, a proposed bill
suggested that the "ownership of. the wind interest is originally
vested in the several owners of the surface." 57 In other areas, the
154 See GETCHES, supra notel45, at 50-53; Dellapenna, supra note 134, at
423 (discussing the relative nature of the reasonableness analysis); see, e.g.,
Hoover v. Crane, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960).
155 See Dellapenna, supra notel34, at 424-25 (noting that although courts
may try to avoid this problem by selecting a pro-rata sharing mechanism to
allocate the waters among the competing users, it still seems that when a
significant change of circumstances occurs, re-evaluation would still be
necessary). See also N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43
Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 833 n.11 (Ct. App. 2006).
Although, at least in theory, once rights are assigned, parties can negotiate
to readjust to changing costs and needs. Yet the option of bargaining is
voluntary, and does not change the fact that rights can be re-challenged in courts,
thus introducing further uncertainties for the parties involved and additional
costs.
156 1 use this phrase to draw on the term 'riparian lands' in the water context.
See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
157 H.R. 10-1158, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010). Although,
as explained above, the legislation in Colorado also provides for a severable
wind right, such that after the initial appropriation the wind rights can be
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fact that landowners lease out the wind blowing over their land158
also attests to a de facto riparian-like regime.
However, a riparian regime also suffers from substantial
problems. While the flexibility of the riparian regime is
advantageous because of its ability to adapt to multiple situations
and account for a wide range of factors, it also creates great
uncertainty for users. Since the use of the resource (whether water
or wind) is subject to ex post judicial review, riparian users are
faced with uncertainties regarding the scope of their rights. This
uncertainty is often cited as a crucial problem of a riparian
regime.15 9  The vagueness of the comparative review and
contextual nature of the "reasonableness" analysis further enhance
the unpredictability of the system.160 Such uncertainties could
undermine the incentives for efficient investment in resources and
development.
This could be true with regards to wind development where,
despite a significant decrease in development prices, installing
wind turbines still involves a significant upfront investment.161
Therefore, given the costs of wind installations and the length of
time needed to return the investment, a potential developer would
need to estimate, inter alia, the risk of having her wind potential
reduced due to interferences or competing users. Under a riparian
system, for the reasons discussed above, a developer will face
significant uncertainties as to the amount of wind available to her
for energy production. These uncertainties would be even further
complicated if all the landowners along the same wind current
wished to erect wind turbines for energy production. In this
situation, although the extraction of energy might be efficient, due
to the uncertainties associated with a riparian regime, all the
landowners would be discouraged from investing in turbines. This
separated from the underlying land and (presumably) traded. In that respect, the
Colorado wind regime may be different from the riparian regime, under which
water rights generally cannot be separated from land.
158 See supra Part I.A.
159 See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 429 (discussing the effects of "the
pervasive uncertainty that arises under traditional riparian rights").
160 As Professor Dellapenna notes, "the only firm rule under riparian rights is
that any use on non-riparian land is per se unreasonable." Dellapenna, supra note
134, at 425.
161 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2014 WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET
REPORT 47-50, 55-56 (2015) (discussing wind power costs trends and shifts in
the price received for the sale of energy produced from wind).
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could cause suboptimal utilization of the resource or lead to lost
opportunity costs.
Another problem of the riparian system lies in its inherent
inability to account for public interests.162 This results from the
nature of the adjudication of riparian rights and the fact that there
is no mechanism for reviewing the rights of all users together. The
adjudication of riparian rights, because they are administered
through adversarial proceedings rather than legislative
proceedings, typically involves only the parties to a particular
dispute and will thus result in defining only the rights of those
parties. Yet looking only at the parties to a specific dispute misses
the full picture. Consider, for example, a dispute between a large
industrial user and a single domestic user located downstream
from the factory; the court will consider just the claims of these
two particular users. In reality, there are often many more users
along the same stream that are not considered simply because they
are not formally parties to the dispute. Nor is the public,
environmental interest in leaving enough of a flow for wild-life to
flourish or for recreational activities represented in the dispute
settlement process. Thus, due to the way in which the riparian
rights are adjudicated, the analysis will generally neither address
other users along the same stream, nor environmental or
recreational concerns.163 Moreover, even if all the users along the
watercourse (or, in our case, the windcourse) could be joined in the
same action, the public interest will still be typically under-
represented.164 Furthermore, once the rights have been adjudicated
there is little room for new public necessities or values to be taken
into account.
For the same reason, the riparian system suffers from a
162 This is due to courts' difficulties in accounting for the public interest
within litigation. See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 425-26.
163 Similarly, Carol Rose pointed out that the riparian water rights analysis
tends to prefer hydropower and industrial uses over other competing uses. Carol
Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 278-85, 294-96 (1990).
164 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 425-26 (discussing the "systematic
bias in favor of large users"); See generally Lynda L. Butler, Allocating
Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship
between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95 (1985-1986)
(suggesting how courts may better account for the public interest); Peter N.
Davis, The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36
ARK. L. REV. 47, (1982-1983) (on public rights to flow levels).
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systematic bias towards large users. Consider again. the dispute
between a large industrial user and a single domestic user located
downstream from the factory. In settling the dispute, the court will
look at the relative utility of each party and determine their rights
accordingly. Since the factory is likely to have greater utility than a
single household, it will typically be favored.165 That analysis may
not always hold true if we consider the accumulated utility of all
the households along the wind-current. Because disputes are
adjudicated only between parties to a specific dispute, such
aggregated considerations are not taken into account, and the result
inefficiently favors large users. When applied to wind, this could
mean disfavoring distributed generation over other competing
large-scale production sites.
The problems associated with the riparian system essentially
derive from the nature of the regime as a common property regime,
under which all members of the community are entitled to use the
resource. In other words, the riparian regime does not necessarily
avoid the difficulties of the tragedy of the commons.166 Thus,
riparian wind rights might be relevant mostly for areas where there
is less competition for the resources-analogous to the relative
abundance of the water in riparian states-and where the problem
of the tragic commons is less likely to arise.
In sum, the traditional riparian regime is the current de facto
situation in some areas where landowners utilize the wind blowing
over their lands, and this solution may be appropriate for areas
with abundant wind resources. However, it is doubtful that this is a
desirable solution for areas where the wind consumption is more
competitive, or where the use of wind resources is expected to be
more extensive.
B. Prior Appropriation
1. Prior Appropriation Water Regime
In the western states, water was treated as a scarce resource,
and, consequently, the right to use water was treated like private
165 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 425 (citing Wallace v. City of
Winfield, 149 P. 693, 695 (Kan. 1915); Fagen v. Mayor of Wharton, 113 A. 920,
920 (N.J. 1920); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787, 788 (N.Y.
1899); Pernell v. City of Henderson, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (N.C. 1941); Town of
Purcellville v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d 700, 702-03 (Va. 1942)).
166 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 426-27 (discussing water).
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property1 67 under a system known as "prior appropriation."1 68 At
the heart of the prior appropriation regime, as the name suggests, is
the rule of first-in-time-first-in-right, such that senior users are
given preference over junior ones. Appropriative rights are defined
with regards to the place, quantity, and manner of the use, but-
notably-based on their priority in time.169 Unlike riparianism,
prior appropriation does not require' ownership of land.
To establish an appropriative right, a user must have made
beneficial use of the water.170 A "beneficial" use is determined by
the quantity of water that can be put to valuable, constructive
use,'7 ' and measured by the quantity that can reasonably be put to
such a beneficial use.172 However, the seniority rule still governs
the allocation, such that the senior user would be favored even if a
167 See GETCHES, supra note 145 at 85-88 (discussing in detail the features of
appropriative rights as property). Getches explains that, while the water itself
typically will belong to the state, appropriative right holders are assigned title to
the use of a particular amount of water once it is appropriated. Also note that
prior appropriation water rights "cannot be taken from an appropriator by the
state or federal government without just compensation." Id at 87. See, e.g., Dep't
of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Wash. 1993) ("A vested [prior
appropriation] water right is a type of private property that is subject to the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on takings without just compensation"). However,
appellant in that case did not succeed in asserting takings claims. Id.
168 The doctrine of prior appropriation was first adopted to accommodate
mining needs in the American West and is generally believed to be consistent
with the miners' pre-existing behaviors. GETCHES, supra note 145 at 81-82; see,
e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 148 (1855) (holding that a miner who had
diverted water from a stream to use in his off-site mining operations had
superior rights to a later miner who was seeking to use the water on riparian
lands). But cf David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive
Justice in the Creation ofProperty Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005) (analyzing
the origins of the prior appropriation doctrine and challenging the traditional
view of prior appropriation as driven solely by economic growth and mining
needs).
169 GETCHES, supra note 145 at 6; Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 432-34.
170 GETCHES, supra note 145 at 77.
171 Id. at 78. Such "beneficial" uses are, for instance, domestic, municipal,
agricultural and industrial uses. Id. at 103-05.
172 Id. at 79 (arguing that the reasonableness requirement should, in theory,
prevent wasteful practices since using more water than is reasonably necessary
should not be considered reasonable and therefore should not be considered a
beneficial use for the purpose of establishing an appropriative right); see, e.g.,
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Wash. 1993) (discussing how
"beneficial use" is determined noting that "[t]o determine the amount of water
necessary for a beneficial use, courts have developed the principle of 'reasonable
use,"' which includes an analysis of the uses to which the water is put, id. at
1050, and consideration of waste, id. at 1051).
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junior user claims a more beneficial use.17 3
Users seeking to establish appropriative rights also need to
adhere to the 'use-it-or-lose-it' rule. If the use is discontinued at
some point, the user may lose her right.174 Historically, creating an
appropriative right also typically involved a diversion
requirement-a right was established only when the water was
diverted away from its natural course or location.17 5 Thus, an
appropriative system favors extractive uses (such as irrigation),
while non-consumptive and in-stream uses (such as environmental
or recreational concerns) were not facilitated. Today, however, the
diversion requirement is seen as more flexible, and a tangible
"physical diversion from the stream" is often no longer required.176
In-stream uses are, thus, recognized today in some states, mostly
by granting in-stream rights to a state agency.'7 7
Lastly, it should be noted that water rights under the prior
appropriation regime can be traded as private property rights.
However the trade of such rights is subject to the "no-injury rule,"
such that the transfer cannot, injure a more junior, recognized user,
thus forcing the parties to account for the externalities of the
transaction.178
2. Applying the Prior Appropriation Regime to Wind Resources
Applying the prior appropriation regime to wind would entail
a 'first-in-time-rule,' such that senior wind users will be superior
in rights to junior ones. Assuming the production of energy would
be found beneficial, if a wind-turbine farm was constructed early
173 GETCHES, supra note 145 at 77-79.
174 Id. at 79.
175 Id. at 77, 97-103. Methods of diversion include dams, canals, reservoirs,
pipes and pumps. Id. at 98.
176 Id. at 101; Getches also explains that historically the diversion requirement
served as a signal to other users that the water has been "claimed," although,
given that most western states use some form of permitting system to govern the
prior appropriation system today, the diversion requirement has become less
significant. Id. at 97.
177 Id at 102. These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming. In-stream appropriations are typically allocated only to a state agency.
Id.
178 Getches explains that courts have found that when a senior right-holder
wishes to change the place of extraction, purpose or time of use, she is obligated
to ensure a junior right-holder the same conditions that existed at the time the
junior right was established. Id. at 109.
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on, junior users in both the upwind and downwind directions might
not be able to construct wind turbines of their own. The new
upwind user would not be allowed to subtract from the wind
available to the senior right-holder, and the downwind user would
be in the wake of the senior right-holder's wind farm.
A prior appropriation regime, as explained above, is akin to a
private property regime. The advantage of individual property
rights is that they provide incentives for investment in the
resources.179 Appropriative rights are also advantageous as
compared to traditional riparianism with regards to the
predictability that the first-in-time rule provides (at least insofar as
seniority in time is a clearer criterion than a "reasonableness"
analysis).180 The increased certainty a senior user has as to her
rights may foster investment in the resource. In the case of wind,
the increased certainty could induce investment in wind energy
development, accelerating the rate of wind energy growth, at least
in the short term.18
However, establishing a first-in-time right might often be a
complicated task, which requires extensive historical evidence.182
179 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and Delay in the
Assignment of Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 379, 381 (2008); BARRY C.
FIELD, NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICs: AN INTRODUCTION 110-14 (2d ed.
2008). See generally Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the
Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2001) (analyzing the ways in which property
rights address the "tragedy of the commons," including the incentives provided
by a system of property rights).
180 On the uncertainties associated with a 'reasonableness' analysis under a
riparian system, see Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 425, 429.
181 As mentioned, the uncertainties currently associated with the state of wind
rights could deter investment, inter alia, due to the risk of costly litigation. See
supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Rule, supra note 42, at 210
(discussing specifically the uncertainties due to potential profit loss through
lawsuits). Accordingly, alleviating some of the uncertainties might serve to foster
investment.
182 Despite the judicial and administrative efforts, in some watercourses the
earliest (and thus the most valuable) rights have not yet be quantified.
Abandoned or forfeited rights can also cause confusion and gaps in the records.
See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 432-34 (citing the following cases that
recognize prescriptive rights: Gibbons v. Globe Dev., Nev., Inc., 553 P.2d 1198
(Ariz. 1976); Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1981); as well as cases and
statutes refusing to recognize prescriptive rights: Alaska Stat. §
46.15.040(a) (2008); Idaho Code Ann. § 42-607 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-
705 (1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.060(5) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-
1 (1989); People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980)).
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Thus, the realms of the rights under prior appropriation might not
be as certain as they seem. Moreover, the central problem of the
prior appropriation regime is that a rule-of-capture actually
encourages suboptimal and premature exploitation of the resource.
In an appropriative world, each user is encouraged to use as much
of the resource as they possibly can, before it is necessary and
regardless of whether it will ever be necessary at all.'83 Since every
user seeks to maximize her future gains, she has an incentive to
use the resource prematurely, or in ways that might be wasteful
and inefficient.1 84 For example, a farmer might be induced to plant
crops that require heavy irrigation (rather than less wasteful crops)
only to maintain her future water rights.
Even if all appropriators only divert as much of the resource
as they actually need, the rule of capture still violates the basic
economic principle of marginal productivity.'85 When there is not
enough of the resource to meet everyone's needs, the most junior
user will have to forego all of her rights before any of the senior
users will lose their rights. 186 This result will occur regardless of
the efficiency of the competing uses.' In other words, the junior
user may be more efficient-for example, it may have installed
more efficient turbines or may be located at a more cost-effective
site-yet the senior user will still 'win.' Thus, absent an efficient
183 Dellapenna, supra note 134, at432-34; see generally John D. Leshy, The
Prior Appropriation Doctrine of Water Law in the West: An Emperor with Few
Clothes, 29 J. WEST 5 (1990); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and
Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28
ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
184 See generally Leshy, supra notel83; Neuman, supra note 183. A rule of
first in time has been criticized as leading to premature consumption, or wasteful
uses, where the resource could have otherwise been used more productively. See,
e.g., David D. Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal Timing; Limiting the
Dissipation of Economic Value, 64 Wash. U. L. Q. 775, 777 (1986)
("[A]warding entitlements by first possession leads to . . . premature
expenditures ... [since] the anticipation of capturing property of future value
induces abandonment of alternative pursuits of positive current productivity.");
Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J. L. &
Econ. 393, 394 (1995) ("[C]ritics have recognized correctly that first possession
has the potential to dissipate wealth-either from a wasteful race to claim an
asset or as a rule of capture that leads to overexploitation.").
185 Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 434; see generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990).
186 GETCHES, supra note 145 at 78.
187 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 434 (referring to "one of the most
extreme examples of this," State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb.
1940)).
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trading system (as will be discussed further below), the resource is
not directed to the next unit of marginal productivity. Furthermore,
senior users are not encouraged to pool the risk with more junior
ones, because they will always have enough of the resource to
secure their needs, regardless of the changing conditions.'88
In the case of wind, a rule-of-capture would encourage-for
example-the construction of large wind farms in certain locations
for the purpose of establishing appropriative wind rights, even if a
more efficient location may exist. A rule of capture would thus
yield an inefficient result when the location to be developed first
has lower energy potential than a competing neighboring
location.'89 The downwind location might be more suitable for
wind energy production, yet it may never be developed because it
will be subject to the senior wind rights. A similar analogy follows
if the more efficient location was actually upwind from the first-in-
time installation, since the senior user would still be entitled to the
same amount of wind she initially captured. This means that the
more efficient upwind location will not be able to extract wind for
energy production, because it will not be allowed to subtract from
the wind available to the senior downwind right-holder. Siting of
wind installations under a prior appropriation reginie will therefore
not reflect the relative efficiency of wind energy capacity in each
locality, but rather will be driven by the need to establish senior
wind rights.
In addition, a seniority-based regime also entrenches existing
uses and allows for very little adjustment to be made once initial
rights are established.190 Therefore, once an inefficient siting has
taken place, it is hard to shift the resource allocation; thus, the
inefficient situation is "locked in."191 New users may be more
productive and efficient than old ones, especially with rapidly
changing technologies and increased understanding of wind
behavior and energy capacity as time goes by. Yet the junior user
will be blocked from materializing her efficient use, denying her-
188 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 434.
189 See Rule, supra note 42, at 228.
190 See Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy:
Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 165, 165 (1998).
191 However, recent case law suggests that the customary amounts do not
necessarily determine the reasonable amount for the purpose of appropriative
rights, and thus might allow room for reallocating resources more efficiently.
See, e.g., Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
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and society at large-the benefits of the most efficient use of the
wind. In addition, since appropriative rights are akin to private
property, they are also subject to hold-out problems.9 2 Senior
right-holders may therefore strategically use their power to prevent
the efficient development of wind energy production in the area.193
Appropriative rights also tend to favor large users. As
mentioned above, to establish rights under the appropriation
system, the resource must be used beneficially.194 The ability,
however, to make beneficial use is often a function of the size of
land or the installation one owns. Appropriative rights, therefore,
tend to favor large users with more resources, who can take
advantage of economies of scale to make more beneficial uses.'95
Here again, the aggregated utility of many small users may be
inefficiently lost in the process.
Lastly, the traditional appropriative system did not afford
much protection to the public interest, since it primarily followed
the first-in-time rule.196 Today however, many prior appropriation
states do facilitate some consideration of the public interest, within
the review of new appropriations.197 This has, to some extent,
192 See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Clean View of the Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Richard A. Epstein,
Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J. L. & ECON. 553 (1993).
193 Since senior right-holders have priority and can prevent or limit junior
right-holders' use of the resource, there is a concern that they might strategically
misuse their priority in order to gain an unwarranted advantage. See generally
Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. L. & ECON. 553 (1993) (discussing the holdout
problem).
194 See GETCHES, supra note 145, at 77-79, 103-05; see also supra text
accompanying notes 171-173.
195 Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 435.
196 A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 772 (2001) (noting problems with prior appropriation
doctrine including that the "perpetual 'use it or lose it rights' lock too much
water into marginal agriculture and generally inefficient off-stream consumptive
uses to the detriment of aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of growing urban
areas").
197 GETCHES, supra note 145 at 80; Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 435-36
(citing Neb. Const. art. XV, § 6; Hardy v. Higginson, 849 P.2d 946, 949 (Idaho
1993); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 698 n.3
(Nev. 1996); Consuelo Bokum, Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in
New Mexico's Water Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 681 (1996); Douglas L. Grant,
Instream Flow Protection and Public Interest Review of Appropriations, 5
RIVERS 294 (1995)).
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mitigated concerns about unprotected public interests under the
appropriative system. Yet this willingness to accommodate some
of the public concerns does not seem to outweigh the complexities
discussed above, especially since a consideration of the public
interest is also available under the regulated riparianism regime, as
will be discussed below. For all these reasons, it seems that the
prior appropriation system is less suitable for coping with the
complexities associated with wind resource allocation.
C. Regulated Riparianism
1. Regulated Riparianism Water Regime
Changing water needs in the twentieth century led about half
of the eastern states to adopt a modified permitting system, often
known as "regulated riparianism."198 This model is based on the
However, importantly, since the consideration of the public interest is only
called for within the review of new appropriations, in practice, it may have only a
minor effect, especially in basins where the majority of the water was previously
appropriated. Id. at 429 (citing Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A
Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing
Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347 (1989)).
198 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 414 (discussing the changing water
needs in the 2 0th century), and at 439-40, nn. 184-201 (listing the states which
he believes have adopted regulated riparian systems (including the relevant
legislation): (1) Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 9-lOB-1 to 9-IOB-30 (2001)); (2)
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to 15-22-622 (2003)); (3) Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-365-22a-380 (West 2006)); (4) Delaware (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (2001)); (5) Florida (FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-.619
(2006)); (6) Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-20 to 12-5-31, 12-5-43 to 12-5-53
(2006)); (7) Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174C (2008)); (8) Iowa (IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261-455B.281 (2004)); (9) Kentucky (KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 151.010-151.600, 151.990 (2006)); (10) Maryland (MD. CODE ANN.,
ENVIRONMENT §§ 5-501 to 5-514 (2007)); (11) Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (2002)); (12) Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
103G.001-103G.315 (1997)); (13) Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to
51-3-55 (1999)); (14) New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-1 to 58:1A-17
(2006)); (15) North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11 to 143-215.22K
(2007)); (16) New York (N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-1501 to 15-1529
(2006)); (17) Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (2006)); and (18)
Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.18, 30.28, 30.292-30.298, 281.35
(2006))). See also D.S. Pensley, The Legalities of Stream Interventions:
Accretive Changes to New York State's Riparian Doctrine Ahead?, 25 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 120-23 (2008) (discussing the shift toward regulated
riparianism); Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free
Trade Agreement Era: As Strong as Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 671 (2007)
("It is noteworthy that common law riparianism is rapidly giving way
to regulated riparianism.").
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traditional riparian concept of "reasonable use," but is governed by
an administrative system.199 Put differently, it is an administrative
permit system that allocates water rights based on the
reasonableness of all users. Under a regulated riparianism system,
use rights are determined ex ante by an administrative state agency
as opposed to ex post by the judiciary.200 Water withdrawal cannot
take place without obtaining "a time-limited permit from the state
within which the withdrawal occurs."2 01
The riparian tradition is continued in the sense that permits
are still granted based on the reasonable use rule.202 Notably, the
administrative system looks not only at the individual permit
holder, but also at other public interests.203 The riparian statutes
often provide for specific types of uses204 and for the explicit
protection of the public interest.205 Under most regulated riparian
systems, permits are granted for set time periods (between three
and twenty years)206 and are typically renewable, subject to re-
199 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The
Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &POL'Y REv. 317, 366-
67 (2000) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Markets for Water] ("The most fundamental
departure from common law riparian rights in regulated riparian statutes is the
requirement that, with few exceptions, water cannot legally be withdrawn from a
water source except pursuant to a permit issued by the state in which the
withdrawal occurs. . . . The 'riparian' element comes from the criterion by which
permit applications are judged, namely whether the proposed use is
'reasonable"'); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid
Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 454 (2008) ("[W]ater law in the East is
moving toward a regulated riparianism under which the basic riparian system is
overlaid with regulation and official permits.").
200 See Pensley, supra note 198, at 121.
201 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 440-41, also referring to Am. Soc'y of
Civil Eng'rs, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE WATER LAWS COMMITTEE § 6R-1-01 (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; GETCHES, supra note 146, at 58-59.
202 See GETCHES, supra note 145, at 60-61; Dellapenna, supra note 134, at
441 (noting that some jurisdictions may supplement the terms "beneficial,"
"reasonable-beneficial," or "equitable" for "reasonable"). Another way in which
regulated riparianism departs from the traditional system is that uses on non-
riparian land are not unreasonable per-se. Idat 441.
203 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 441; see also MODEL CODE, supra note
201, at § 7R-1-01(1).
204 One example of this could perhaps be the right of way permits established
by the BLM for the use of wind blowing over federal lands (see infra Part II),
although the discussion here is not limited to the BLM permits.
205 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 441; GETCHES, supra note 145, at 60;
see also MODEL CODE, supra.note 201, at §§ 4R-2-01 to -04.
206 See Dellapenna, supra note 135, at 441.With some exceptions for certain
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evaluating reasonableness in light of any new developments.20 7
Permits may also be revisited in times of severe scarcity or
emergency needs.208 Regulated riparianism can be understood as
analogous to a public ownership model,209 in the sense that the
water belongs collectively to all members of the state, and
individual use is permitted only subject to explicit permission.
2. Applying Regulated Riparianism to Wind Resources: Creating
Wind- Use Permits
Applying a regulated riparianism regime to wind resources
entails establishing a system for allocating wind use permits,
limited to a certain time period and subject o certain conditions set
out by the administrative agency.
210
A regulated riparianism regime for wind may be complicated
and expensive to establish, as there are substantial costs involved
in imposing an elaborate administrative system.211 In addition,
since regulated riparianism relies essentially on the reasonable use
rule, some of the problems associated with the application of a
reasonableness analysis could apply as well.
Furthermore, it is not always clear that the administrative
system is sufficiently informed to handle such complex resource
allocation. Determining how much wind can .be extracted is a
particularly challenging task. For instance, deciding at what point
the benefit of energy production outweighs the costs of leaving the
homes in the downwind direction without a breeze is a complex
analysis. Deciding how much. wind needs to be left for
environmental and recreational purposes further complicates the
analysis.212  Taken together, this becomes a challenging
public-related projects, the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code sets twenty
years as the duration of the permits. See MODEL CODE, supra note 201, at § 7R-
1-02.
207 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 441; GETCHES, supra note 145, at 61.
208 However, it is not clear how often review powers are in fact used.
Regulated riparian regimes typically provide for a hearing process within the
agency and for judicial review of agency decisions, although courts mostly tend
to defer to the agency's review on this matter. See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at
442.
209 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 414-15.
210 The permits issued by the BLM for the extraction of wind from BLM-
managed lands (see infra Part 11) could serve as an illustrative example, although
the analysis here is not limited to such permits. .
211 See Dellapenna, Markets for Water, supra note 199, at 373-75.
212 See Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons:
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examination requiring significant knowledge and expertise.
Managing wind currents requires obtaining and studying large
amounts of information in various fields, such as meteorological
conditions, geographical features of the region, and production and
technology costs. The agency may be in a better position to obtain
the necessary information with regards to some of these fields. For
instance, the agency may be able to invest more in research
pertaining to the meteorological conditions of the entire district or
study the cumulative environmental effects of constructing huge
wind farms throughout the region. Yet with regards to other types
of information, such as production costs and methods, the industry
is more likely better positioned to obtain the necessary data.
Industry has access to information in this respect that may be
impossible or prohibitively costly for the administrative agency to
obtain.213
The administrative system may also be subject to increased
political pressures compared with the judicial system, which is
typically thought to be more immune from -such strains. There
might be concerns over captured interests that negatively influence
the decision-making process within the agency.2 14 For instance,
various interest groups, such as producers of wind turbines or large
scale wind farm developers, which stand to benefit considerably
from the expansion of wind development, might be inclined to
weigh in on agency decision making in various ways.
Despite these difficulties, regulated riparianism has some
significant advantages. First, the determination of ex ante rights by
the administrative system provides for increased certainty, as
Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-fashioned Common
Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 45, 53-58 (1999) (discussing
the complexities involved in setting the contours of the permits, and specifically
in defining the "total allowable resource use," albeit in a different context than
water permits).
213 Consider, for instance, the information relating to costs of siting, turbine
installation and ongoing maintenance, employee training for wind-related
installations, and more.
214 Agency capture theory suggests that special interests wield undue
influence over an agency because of the regulated industries' increased
motivations and abilities to lobby, as compared to the unorganized general
public. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency
Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 49-54 (1993) (discussing specifically the
application of agency capture theory to the EPA); see Reid Mullen, Statutory
Complexity Disguises Agency Capture in Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 927, 931 (2007).
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compared to the traditional riparian regime. A permit holder knows
in advance exactly how much of the resource she can use and for
how long.215 Investors would therefore be able to rely on the
amount of resources available to them and the expected return
period on their investment. Increased certainty ex ante would
foster efficient investment in resource development, furthering the
utilization of wind energy for the benefit of local residents, as well
as green-house gas reductions. At the same time, because regulated
riparianism is not subject to a rule-of-capture (unlike the prior
appropriation regime), it is not expected to push for premature and
extraneous development.216 In short, a wind rights permitting
system will avoid both the problem of uncertain conditions that
hinder development associated with traditional riparianism, and the
difficulties of a rule of capture and hasty development associated
with prior appropriation. It could potentially allow for optimal
investment in wind energy development.
A permitting system may be especially advantageous in areas
where the competition over wind use is great or rapidly increasing.
As mentioned, higher proximity of users is likely to increase the
conflicts over energy extraction; although wind is renewable, it
may be slowed down in the short term, and, depending on the
ground conditions,217 it may never regain its prior speeds. In other
words, the recovery of wind requires time and distance, so the
closer users are to each other, the less likely that recovery will take
place. Accordingly, in denser user areas, landowners are more
likely to come into conflict over wind use. In such a situation, the
problems of premature capture or the fear of interference that
might hinder investment become all the more pressing. Therefore,
particularly where the proximity of the users is increased and the
competition over the existing wind resources is high, an
administrative permit system is all the more necessary. Urban
areas might become an interesting example of such a competitive
environment, due to the recent expansion of distributed generation
and small wind installations.218
215 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 440-41.
216 Id. at 433.
217 The frictional drag of trees, rocks, valleys or even buildings can slow the
wind down. See AHRENS, supra note 6, at 215. For a more detailed description of
the physical forces that influence the wind, see id.at 205-09.
218 See supra notes 53-55 (discussing distributed generation and small wind
growth).
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The efficient development under such a permitting system
will depend on the manner in which the permits are crafted. If the
duration of the permit is too short, there may not be enough time to
recover the costs of the investment, and developers would likely
avoid the investment altogether.219 This may be particularly true
with regards to wind, because, although the cost of wind producing
technology has significantly dropped in recent years, there are still
substantial initial investments and long return periods.220 Although,
this problem may be mitigated by extending the duration of the
permits to allow for investment to take place. Additional
uncertainty could result, again like in the case of water,221 from the
agency's power to revisit and modify permits in times of
emergencies. However, this does not seem to be a substantial
problem with water permits, as it appears that "agencies
seldom . . . refuse to renew a permit."2 2 Similar agency behavior
could possibly be expected with regards to wind permits.
Second, regulated riparianism is also favorable in its ability to
account for the interests of all the affected users along the wind-
stream. As opposed to both traditional riparianism and prior
appropriation, reviewing the allocation of permits ex ante by the
agency allows taking into consideration all interests involved at the
time.223 For instance, the agency is likely to be in a better position
to assess the aggregated effects of small wind producers. These
cumulative impacts may be extremely beneficial in terms of
greenhouse gas reductions, yet there could also be problems that
219 See George A. Gould, A Westerner Looks at Eastern Water Law:
Reconsideration of Prior Appropriation in the East, 25 U. ARK. LITYLE ROCK L.
REv. 89, 109-10 (2002).
220 See supra Part IV.A.ii.
221 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First
Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 539, 591-92 (2004); Dellapenna, supra note 134, at
445.
222 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 445 (also noting that evidence suggests
that the problem is actually the opposite one: that agencies often insufficiently
use their powers rather than use them too aggressively); Dellapenna, Adapting
Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, supra note 221, at 591-92.
223 This is definitely true for the initial round of permit allocations, before
any rights have been allocated (and assuming no right holders are grandfathered
in). For the subsequent rounds of allocations or reviews of permit renewals, it is
not clear that the permits would expire at the same time. As a result, they might
not in fact be evaluated together. In any case, the agency might still be in a better
position to evaluate the renewal of permits, given that it has the relevant
information about the permits it has issued at any given time, regardless of when
they expire.
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are similar to those that occur with the construction of too many
dams on a river. Either way, the agency would have the broader
outlook necessary to address these cumulative impacts. Yet, if the
allocation of wind rights were to depend on a rule of capture (as
with prior appropriation) or a singular comparative utility analysis
(as with traditional riparianism), these cumulative impacts will
likely be overlooked. Whereas the agency examining the entire
wind basin will be in a better position to assess the aggregated
impacts of wind energy production in the region or neighborhood,
both in terms of its ability to have a broader outlook and its
capability to re-arrange permits if necessary according to the
cumulative impacts of wind-production.
Furthermore, an administrative permitting system may also be
better positioned to protect the public interest, including the
ecosystem uses of the wind. As mentioned, wind has an important
role in our natural environment, from the creation of weather
conditions to the pollination of seeds. Here again, it seems that an
ex ante permit allocation system is best suited to account for such
needs. Neither the prior appropriation nor the traditional riparian
regime can sufficiently account for the ecosystem values of the
wind. Whereas regulated riparian systems often address such
concerns through the mandated considerations of the public
interest, such as, for example, a requirement to "protect some
minimum flow" for wildlife preservation or for human well-
being.224 The Regulated.Riparian Model Water Code, for example,
"requires protection of the biological, chemical, and physical
integrity of the water source, defined in terms of federal, state, and
other relevant legal standards."225 Similar mandates could possibly
be enacted with regards to wind permit allocation, requiring the
agency to consider preserving some minimum wind current for
wildlife preservation or human welfare.
In addition, depending on the level of government charged
with allocating the wind rights and the state involved, allocating
224 Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 443-44. See, e.g., Lee P. Breckenridge,
Maintaining Instream Flow and Protecting Aquatic Habitat: Promise and Perils
on the Path to Regulated Riparianism, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 595, 612-20 (2004)
(discussing the regulatory challenges of achieving instream flow and protecting
aquatic ecosystems); Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for
Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1047 n.281 (2005) (noting which riparian
states have incorporated stream flow protections into their regulations).
225 See Dellapenna, supra note 134, at 443-44.
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administrative permits might also be subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 226 or an equivalent state
legislation. The agency would thus be required to perform an
environmental review,227 which may include the ecosystem impact
of extracting large amounts of energy from the wind in a particular
location. While the mandate of NEPA-like regimes in states is
sometimes limited to merely conducting an environmental study
and may not amount to a concrete obligation to protect the
ecosystem,228 reviewing the environmental impacts of wind energy
production may nevertheless be beneficial. At the very least it
could highlight the impacts of energy extraction that are often not
accounted for due to problems of collective action and externalities
discussed above.
In sum, although regulated riparianism is not a perfect system
and it no doubt has some difficulties, it is the regime best-suited to
address the challenges of wind right allocation and the challenges
of future energy production. An administrative permitting system
allows users sufficient certainty to ensure investment, yet at the
same time takes the public interest into account when necessary.
This is especially true in regions where competition over the use of
wind resources is higher, such as in urban areas.
226 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
227 This environmental review could be an Environmental Assessment or
could amount to a full Environmental Impact Statement, provided that the
proposed "major federal action" is "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012);see also CHRISTINE A. KLEIN,
FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-
BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 133-45 (2d ed. 2009); Mary K.
Fitzgerald, Comment, Small-Handles, Big Impacts: When Should the National
Environmental Policy Act Require an Environmental Impact Statement?, 23 B.C..
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 437-44 (1996); George J. Skelly, Note, Psychological
Effects at NEPA 's Threshold, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 336, 336-39 (1983).
228 See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 808,
816 (2008) (discussing the nature of the obligations under NEPA, and noting
specifically that states' "NEPA-like programs . . . all adopt the basic imprint of
the federal scheme"). However, some of the "little NEPAs" do contain
substantial obligations, which might suggest that state agencies would be
required to consider the environmental impact of a proposed permitting action.
See id. at 808, 816 ("[S]ome state NEPAs create substantive obligations on the
part of state agencies to consider the environmental impacts of a proposed
action.").
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D. Markets
1. Water Markets
In addition to the three water regimes mentioned, in recent
decades a fourth water regime has emerged that utilizes market
mechanisms to allocate water resources. Rising urban and
environmental demands for water have caused growing pressure to
shift water allocations to the most productive uses and away from
agricultural uses that have traditionally held significant amounts of
states' water supply, at least in the western United States.229 The
market allows users to trade water permits, and water markets are
therefore seen as a powerful tool for facilitating an efficient
reallocation of water rights.230 The idea is that permit holders can
trade water extraction rights with others. With a robust market and
sufficient trading, the trading market should reflect the level of
water scarcity in the area through price signals thereby
incentivizing efficient uses.231 For example, a farmer who
229 See, e.g., Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1888 (2005) As Glennon explains, "The transfer of water
from farms to cities lessens the pressure to build new dams, to divert even more
surface water, and to pump more groundwater. .. . In California, as in most
western states, farmers use between 70% and 80% of the state's fresh water. One
cannot seriously address the question of new demands for water without focusing
on agriculture. . . . The economic value of this water to cities dwarfs the value of
the same water to the farmers. It makes economic sense to let the water support
the higher value activity." Id.
230 See Jedidiah Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West:
1987-2005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1023 (2007) (reviewing the existing
water markets in the different states and analyzing the dynamics of water
transfers); Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A
Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big
Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 293 (2001) (discussing the key
institutional features that are likely to impact that transaction costs associated
with water trading); see generally Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the
Development of Western Water Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law
vs. Central Planning, 80 OR. L. REV. 861 (2001).
However, there are also some difficulties in applying water markets. See, e.g.,
Dellapenna, supra note 134; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the
Washington Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383 (2008).
For an insightful analysis of water markets, see Vanessa Casado-Perez, Markets
and Government: the Case of Water (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, New York
University School of Law) (on file with author).
231 See, e.g., Terry Anderson & Gary D. Libecap, A Market Solution for Our
Water Wars, DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER INSTITUTION JOURNAL (January 12,
2011), http://www.hoover.org/research/market-solution-our-water-wars (last
visited Mar. 13, 2015) (discussing how water markets may provide an efficient
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previously grew a type of crop that used substantial amounts of
water, she may change her crops to those that use less water and
sell off her "extra" permits. That way, water allocations will shift
from wasteful uses to more efficient ones through the market
mechanism. An example of a water market can be found in
California.232
2. Creating Wind Markets
It may also be advantageous to set up markets that allow for
trading units of wind energy extraction. Such a trading scheme
could facilitate the exchange of wind-energy units within the same
'wind basin.'2 33 Each unit would define how much energy could be
extracted from a single wind basin or wind stream, and the parties
could bargain and transfer the rights to extract wind, allowing the
most efficient siting of the turbines to take place through the
market system. Another way of thinking of this could be similar,
but conceptually opposite, to emissions trading schemes such as
the Acid Rain regime under the Clean Air Act in the United
StateS234 or the carbon trading regimes235 established in the
solution to problems of scarcity, and noting that "[w]here water markets are
being allowed to work, prices reflect scarcity and trades provide incentives to
conserve").
232 See Vanessa Casado-Pdrez, Missing Water Markets: A Cautionary Tale of
Governmental Failure, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 157 (2015); JEDIDIAH BREWER ET
AL., NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH , PAPER No. 13002, WATER MARKETS IN
THE WEST: PRICES, TRADING, AND CONTRACTUAL FORMS (2007), http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl3002; see generally Richard Howitt & Ellen Hanak,
Incremental Water Market Development: The California Water Sector 1985-
2004, 30 CAN. WATER RESOURCES J. 73 (2005).
233 1 use the phrase 'wind basin' to draw on the term 'water basin' or
watershed.' See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, Watershed as a Public Natural
Resource on the Federal Lands, 11 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 13 (1991); A. Dan
Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. &POL'Y REV. 69, 70 (2000); J.B. Ruhl, The (Political) Science of Watershed
Management in the Ecosystem Age, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 519,
522 (1998).
234 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2006). Title IV of the Clean Air Act sets up a trading
regime that allows emitters to trade units of emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO 2).
See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography:
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional
Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 582-98 (2001) (discussing air pollution
trading programs). Similarly, the California South Coast Air Quality
Management District set up a local emissions trading scheme for trading SO2 in
the Los-Angeles area. Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV., 293, 300-01
(2008) (describing the Los Angeles regime); see also Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2015 487
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Northeastern states of the United States,236 in California,237 and in
the EU.238 Instead of stipulating how much one can put in the air,
the wind trading regime would define how much one can take out
of the air.
To clarify, such a wind market aims to facilitate trade in the
rights to use the kinetic energy within the wind. Such a market
would be separate from markets for trading in the electricity that is
L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 361, 371-72 (1989) (describing other emissions trading practices under the
Clean Air Act, including netting, offsets, and bubbles); Robert W. Hahn &
Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 119-29, 132-36 (1989)
(describing offsets, bubbles, and netting); see generally, Richard B. Stewart,
Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 94 (1990);
James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1994)
(discussing the idea of an emissions trading system as alternative to a "command
and control" regime).
235 There is much scholarly and policy attention given to marketable permits
in the context of greenhouse gases. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J.
677, 712-13 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity:
Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 2 (2012); Carol
M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing
Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property
Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 45, 51 (1999); Stavins, supra note 234,
at 300.
236 REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/
regulations (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
237 CAL. CODE REGS. tit.. 17, § 95801 (2015); Cap-and-Trade Program,
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
capandtrade.htm (last visited Sept.15, 2015). California and Quebec agreed to
integrate their cap-and-trade markets in 2013. Agreement between the Cal. Air
Resources Board and the Gov. of Quebec Concerning the Harmonization and
Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/linkage/caquebec linkingagreement-english.pdf (last visited
Sept. 25, 2013); see California and Quebec Sign Agreement to Integrate,
Harmonize their Cap-and-Trade Programs, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=508.
238 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
the European Unioh, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive
96/61/EC, Oct. 13, 2003, O.J. (L 275, 25.10.2003) 32, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02003LOO87-20140430
&from=EN; The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/indexen.htm; Susan J.
Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: Efficiency,
Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 699-700 (2006) (discussing
the EU emissions trading system).
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created from wind power or the renewable credits that are
generated through various tax mechanisms or renewable
portfolios.23 9 Rather, a wind market in this context is only meant to
enable users to trade the rights to use energy within the wind itself,
in the same way that water quotas are traded through the market
systems to allow for more efficient allocation of the resource.
Setting up a trading program requires, first, defining the set of
entitlements individuals have and which they can trade.240 The
initial allocation of rights (before they are traded) can be done
through any number of systems,241 including the mechanisms
discussed above for allocating wind rights.242 In order to facilitate
trade wind rights need to be accurately defined, since trade will not
take place unless there is sufficient certainty regarding the rights to
use the resource.243 This may be particularly challenging regarding
wind, since defining the wind current along which trading can take
place might be more complicated than establishing, for example,
water basins. For that reason, not all of the property regimes
discussed above can serve as an underlying basis for creating a
trading system. Particularly, a traditional riparian regime might not
be suited to allocate rights for the purpose of trading due to the
uncertainties associated with the definition of rights under such a
239 See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, supra note
19, for an overview of current state incentives regarding renewable energy and
efficiency.
240 Defining the commodity is a necessary element for the development of a
market in that specific commodity. See, e.g., BLAS Luis PlREZ HENRiQUEZ,
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMODITIES MARKETS AND EMISSIONS TRADING: TOWARDS A
LoW-CARBON FUTURE 29-30 (2013) (discussing the requirements outlined in the
economic literature for setting up a market, and specifically the notion of an
"environmental commodity").
241 In that sense, a trading scheme can actually be seen as a subset of any
property regime, whether the property interests are allocated and governed by the
administrative system or the judiciary. Since property rights are alienable and
subject to transfer, once such rights are established, efficient trading can take
place. Accordingly, once wind rights are recognized as a property interest that
can be protected and transferred, the right to extract energy from the wind can
also be traded. Setting up some kind of a property regime is thus the basis for
initiating a market.
242 See supra Part IV.A (applying riparianism to wind), Part IV.B (applying
prior appropriation to wind) and Part IV.C (applying regulated riparianism to
wind).
243 See Rose, supra note 212, at 59; Carol M. Rose, What Governments Can
Do for Property (and Vice Versa), THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 259, 284 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren
J. Samuels eds., 1999) (likewise asserting the importance of defined rights).
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regime. A prior appropriation regime, however, could perhaps
serve as a mechanism for allocating rights prior to trading since it
provides more definitive property rights.244 Likewise, a regime
similar to regulated riparianism could be used to set up the basic
rights that are traded. This would mean that individuals would
obtain permits to extract energy from the wind, and then trade
these permits.245
In other words, of the regimes discussed above, the ones
suitable for serving as a base-line for the market are the prior
appropriation regime and the regulated riparianism regime (or an
equivalent administrative permitting system). In principle either
could serve as a basis for setting up a market. Yet, for reasons
discussed above, the administrative permitting system is likely the
most favorable regime for governing the wind resources.246 Thus,
this Note suggests that combining the permit regime with a
marketable scheme would be most beneficial. In areas with
increased competition, the combination of the permitting system
and the market mechanism is most fruitful. In fact, most of the
trading regimes involving air, such as acid rain or carbon markets,
are premised on a similar notion, where property interests are
allocated to the individual users through a system that is fashioned
and governed by the administrative system and are then traded by
the individual users.247 The combination of an administrative
244 However, note that the "no-injury rule," which stipulates that the transfer
of rights in the prior appropriation system cannot injure a more junior recognized
user, might complicate the transfer and trading of rights. See GETCHES, supra
note 145, at 109.
245 To clarify, while-this suggestion implies that government should use
permits to facilitate trade, it does not necessarily mean that such permits would
be identical in nature or process to the ones discussed above in the regulated
riparianism section. Permits that are set up with the intention of facilitating trade
could vary in their structure and goals. Both the process and the outcome of these
two types of permits could be very different.
246 See supra Part IV.C.
247 See Stewart, supra note 234, at 94; Krier, supra note 235, at 453; Rose,
supra note 212, at 51.
Importantly,. the method of the initial allocation of allowances in these trading
regimes does not necessarily follow a 'regulated riparianism' model. Often,
trading allowances are distributed on the basis of historical usages
('grandfathering'). See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict
Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 505 (2000); see generally Jonathan Remy Nash,
Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809 (2009). It is also possible to auction off
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permitting system and the trading regime thus seems most
advantageous for governing an airborne fugitive resource such as
the wind.
In any case, as demonstrated above, at present given the lack
of existing judicial or legislative guidance on the subject, wind
rights are currently not well-defined and their status is mostly
uncertain. Therefore, the first step in establishing a wind market
should be establishing better defined wind rights.
A second challenge in the application of a wind market might
be protecting 'in-stream' uses, so as to allow for the continued
flow of airstream for environmental or recreational purposes.2 48
Put differently, protecting the ecosystem values of wind through
the market scheme could be challenging, as ecosystems are often
undervalued, and those concerned with protecting the ecosystems
might be subject to collective action problems or might not be able
to raise the funds necessary to purchase the required wind rights.
There are several other questions regarding the shape and
content of wind markets that are yet to be resolved. There may be
questions concerning, such as: how we define wind basins; how
much wind should be extracted; what kind of trading mechanism
do we use; how we should deal with existing users
(grandfathering); and much more. Discussing all these questions in
detail is beyond the scope of this Note. Moreover, given the
current stage of the development of wind regimes, and the fact that
too many pieces of the puzzle are still missing, an analysis of these
details is probably premature. This Note intends to suggest that
market mechanisms can be beneficial for managing the use of
wind in areas where the extraction of wind is intensive and
competitive. The aim is merely to lay out a framework, and set the
ground for future discussion.
Despite the difficulties mentioned, wind markets present a
promising mechanism for regulating wind. Marketable trading
schemes are considered to be particularly advantageous for
facilitating interactions among strangers, and they are believed to
the tradable permits. See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 234, at 317-21; Nash
&Revesz, supra note 234, at 575-76. The issue of initial allocation of permits is
no doubt a very significant one, although a full-analysis of how wind rights
would be initially allocated is beyond the scope of this Note.
248 For an analogous discussion i the context of water, see Paul R. Williams
& Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in
Protecting California's Instream Values, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 132 (1990).
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be especially suited for widely dispersed resources.249 Being a
widely distributed and scattered resource, wind is suitable for
trading. Siting the wind turbines through the market system would
allow for the most efficient location and levels of extraction to be
determined through the market system, and accounting for the
costs and benefits associated with the production. A trading
scheme is also considered the most cost-efficient solution,250 which
can achieve the result of efficient siting and optimal use of the
wind.
Moreover, since developers and producers are in the best
position to obtain information regarding the costs of construction
and electricity production, they can also decide if and when to
invest in wind-energy. At the same time, the data regarding
meteorological and geographical conditions or aggregated effects
of energy extraction can be considered by the administrative
system allocating the tradable permits.
I Lastly, the market system could allow for increased flexibility
in wind rights allocation,251 enabling it to respond both to changes
in production and technology costs (since producers will buy or
sell energy units depending on their costs of production and the
price of electricity), as well as environmental concerns (by
controlling the amount of permits allocated). While establishing a
wind market in rural areas with vast wind resources and few users
may be unnecessary, in areas where the use of wind resources is
competitive and conflict over the use of wind is more frequent,252
such wind markets could be effective.
249 Rose, supra note 22, at 68; see generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard
B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
Another example of market-based regimes controlling widespread hazards or
resources can be found in trading of fishing quotas. See Katrina M. Wyman,
From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 117, 155-57 (2005) (reviewing the development of individual
transferable quotes in fisheries).
250 See Stavins, supra note 234, at 298; see generally Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 249.
251 See Stavins, supra note 234, at 329-30 (discussing the flexibilities of a
CO 2 cap-and-trade regime).
252 See infra Part LA (discussing the conditions under which conflicts over the
use of wind are more likely to arise).




Wind presents a promising, clean, resource for energy
production, which is likely to become even more significant in
years to come due to the challenges of climate change. Wind also
carries significant ecological and recreational value. Although
wind can replenish itself, it is not infinite on a local scale because
extracting kinetic energy from wind leaves less energy available in
the downwind direction. As a result, conflicts can arise. Despite
the apparent importance of wind resources, there is very little
judicial or legislative guidance on the governance of wind. .
This Note therefore attempts to outline the structure of a wind
regime such that the externalities associated with the uncontrolled
use of wind would be accounted for; the wind resources would be
protected put to the most efficient use. Drawing on more mature
regimes governing water, a similarly fluid and fugitive asset,
provides helpful lessons for crafting wind law. After examining the
application of four water regimes to wind resources, this Note
concludes that an administrative permitting system that resembles
the 'regulated riparianism' regime is best suited for a majority of
the country. This is due to its ability both to provide investors with
the necessary certainty of profit and to reasonably account for
public interests. Once the property interests in wind are defined
through the permits, they can also be traded, so that wind markets,
in addition to permitting systems, allowing permit holders to trade
wind permits and encouraging the most efficient siting to take
place through the market system. Such regimes may be
unnecessary in rural areas with vast wind resources and very few
users, but may be especially useful in areas where the use of wind
is more competitive. The most competitive settings occur where
the users are clustered together, such as urban areas. For those
rural areas with abundant wind resources, where there are likely to
be fewer conflicts over the use of wind, a regime such as
'traditional riparianism' may be appropriate, and in fact is already
the de facto regime in some regions today.
Naturally, there are still many unanswered questions and
unexplored realms in the effort to fashion a comprehensive wind
regime. For example, even once the type of regime has been
outlined, there remain questions of which level of government is
best suited to address the issues of wind governance. To draw
another analogy, water law is typically within state jurisdiction.
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This could suggest that wind law should be dominated by state
regulation as well. Localized governance enables beneficial
tailoring to the specific needs and characteristics of each location.
However, other fugitive assets, such as clean air, are federally
regulated. Arguably, the same considerations that led to federal
regulation of the particles in air could also dominate regulation of
the movement of air. Further, if wind was to be primarily regulated
by the states, there could be problems with interstate wind
externalities. In other words, the same adversarial wind conflicts
that exist in a local setting could eventually materialize on a larger
scale, and one state could suffer the depleted wind current caused
by the vigorous wind use of its neighboring state.253 Moreover, this
problem could also materialize on an international level, calling
into question the management of cross-boundary resources.
The nuances and intricacies of these regimes would need to be
addressed at a later stage, such as mechanisms for applying for
permits or the ways in which 'wind-basins' would be defined for
the purpose of rights allocation. There are indeed many details
within the suggested regimes that are not addressed in this Note.
The analysis of these complex issues, and other issues that pertain
to the establishment of new wind rights, is however, left for
another day, as this Note merely attempts to lay down a general
outline for crafting the new wind regimes, to establish a
framework, and to set the stage for future discussion.
Indeed, the analysis of wind law is clearly far from reaching
its full scope, and further research is still needed to establish a
widespread wind regime. Yet laying down an outline for the wind
regimes is nonetheless important at present, since wind energy
raises some striking challenges to resource allocation and
management. These issues should be addressed in fashioning the
future wind regimes, so that we can all enjoy the full financial and
environmental potential of wind for many years to come.
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Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996). A full
analysis of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
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